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CREATING THE NATIONAL WEALTH:  AUTHORSHIP, 
COPYRIGHT, AND LITERARY CONTRACTS 
MICHAEL BRANDON LOPEZ* 
“Whereas if we approach a poet without this prejudice we shall often 
find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of his work may be 
those in which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most 




The United States is a party to the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works.  This Treaty provides for the protection of, 
among other things, author’s moral rights, which are independent of 
protection afforded by traditional United States copyright law.  Despite the 
United States’ accession to this Treaty, author’s moral rights are not 
protected under current law, except in very narrow circumstances.  This 
Article addresses the important role that authors have as originators of 
creative works that advance the cultural interests of the Nation and inspire 
future creative efforts.  As such, this Article argues for adopting a regime 
that includes protection for author’s moral rights, through both statutory and 
contracts law.  This Article discusses that the United States is not fulfilling 
its obligations under the Berne Convention, despite protestations to the 
contrary, and discusses the reasons for resistance to full adherence to the 
treaty.  Moreover, this Article addresses the role of an author’s work and its 
relationship and importance to the public domain. In reaching these 
conclusions, this Article explores the historical development of copyright 
protection, its development in the United States, including discussions of 
both statutory law and historic case law addressing authors.  In addition, 
 
* This Article has been measured and shaped in large part by discussions with William P. 
Johnson at the University of North Dakota School of Law, and it is to him that I dedicate this 
work.  The contributions of friends and colleagues in North Dakota cannot be underestimated – in 
particular, Patti Alleva, Gregory S. Gordon, Joshua P. Fershee, Michael Crowell Beard, Michael 
D. Lockhart, Michael S. McGinniss, Jan Stone, Benjamin J. Williams, and Larry Woiwode – all 
contributed to my intellectual development and growth which allowed for the shaping, depth, and 
reach of this argument to realize its full potential.  Those many discussions refined my ideas, and 
their contributions to my own thinking are scattered throughout these pages.  Though, in proper 
Medieval fashion – the errors are my own. 
1. T.S. Eliot, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in MODERNISM:  AN ANTHOLOGY, 152, 
152 (Lawrence Rainey ed., 2005). 
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this Article examines the protections afforded to authors under current 
copyright law as well as Constitutional interpretations of the Federal 
Constitution’s copyright clause as they relate to these issues.  This Article 
also analyzes the effect of those interpretations on understanding the role of 
the author in relation to the rights and interests of the public.  Finally, this 
Article addresses the changing framework for assessing the rights and 
interests of authors and the public in light of recent case law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1579, the great Elizabethan poet Sir Philip Sidney wrote in his A 
DEFENCE OF POETRY, “[on] the behalf of all poets, that while you live, you 
live in love, and never get favour for lacking skill of a sonnet; and, when 
you die, your memory die from the earth for want of an epitaph.”2  In his 
essay, Sidney exhorts the capacity poets have to create the world, to 
interpret the natural phenomena that we encounter and live in, and to shape 
reality.3  Sidney’s vision is a romantic one that would later be taken up by, 
among others, the poets William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, all of whom illuminate the resources that poets are to the 
societies and communities in which we live, work, and operate.4  Ironically, 
Sidney’s A DEFENCE OF POETRY also had to guard against the rampant 
censorship that authors were forced to endure in his contemporary 
community in England, as part of the monopoly enjoyed by the Stationer’s 
Company, operating under the Royal seal.5  Operating within these 
confines, Sidney deftly moves the reader through his argument concerning 
poetry and its ability to tell truth through metaphor, allegory, and other 
rhetorical devices designed to fool the censors about his true literary 
message.6 
 
2. SIR PHILIP SIDNEY, A DEFENCE OF POETRY 75 (J.A. Van Dorsten ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
1966) (1595). 
3. BERYS GAUT, ART, EMOTION AND ETHICS 4 (2007) (“Sidney argued that poetry, with its 
capacity to delineate precise situations and its power to move even obdurate hearts was of all 
discourses the most suited to teach virtue.”). 
4. See JAY PARINI, WHY POETRY MATTERS 22 (2008). 
5. CYNDIA SUSAN CLEGG, PRESS CENSORSHIP IN ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND 20-21 (1997). 
6. Robert E. Stillman, The Truths of a Slippery World:  Poetry and Tyranny in Sidney’s 
‘“Defence,’” 55 RENAISSANCE Q. 1287, 1295 (2002). 
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Consequently, in our modern society, Sidney could not have 
anticipated authors have no right, absent contractual provisions to the 
contrary, to attribution for their work.  Moreover, if authors did not believe 
the work conformed to their fullest abilities, or viewed the work as against 
their individual sensibility and morality they could not, absent contractual 
provisions to the contrary, cause the work to be withdrawn from 
publication.7  Indeed, authors without specific provisions embodied in a 
publication agreement, do not have an absolute right to the integrity of their 
work.8  Moreover, under our regime of copyright law, an author’s work can 
be modified and distorted, ultimately subverting the author’s intentions and 
artistic vision.9  As well, authors typically have no control to decide the 
timing and method of the publication, known as the right of disclosure.10  
These aforementioned rights are known as moral rights, and they arguably 
vest intrinsically in the author as creator of an individual work of artistic 
merit, at the moment of that work’s inception.11 
And yet we live in a society that cherishes notions of intellectual 
property, and that recognizes that creators of original works of artistic merit 
are deserving of reward in the form of a limited copyright to authors for 
their work.12  Such a specific reward of exclusivity over their work ensures 
authors can exploit their original creations, while also maintaining the valid 
rights the public has to the intellectual achievements and advancements of 
author’s creation, wherein at the limited-term expiration of the copyright 
the work passes into the public domain, free for all to use.13  These tensions 
concerning the private economic interests of the individual author, and the 
right of the public to the work, reflect the philosophical and economic 
struggle between the desire to allow an individual to exploit the fruits of 
 
7. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY:  FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 23 (2010) (“Although copyright law would seem to be the most 
natural avenue for authors seeking to redress violations of the integrity of their texts, such 
protections historically have been noticeably absent from the statutory scheme.  Rather than afford 
protection for the personal rights of authors with respect to their works, copyright law in this 
country predominantly safeguards the pecuniary rights of the copyright owner . . . .”). 
8. Id at 23-35 (discussing potential remedies available to an author under United States law). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 44. 
11. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 356 
(2006) (enumerating some of the major moral rights). 
12. Benjamin Davidson, Note, Lost in Translation:  Distinguishing Between French and 
Anglo-American Natural Rights in Literary Property, and How Dastar Proves that the Difference 
Still Matters, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 583, 585 (2005) (discussing the Framers desire to balance 
public rights to works of intellectual advancement with the private, economic interests of 
individual authors). 
13. Alina Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship:  Allocating Entitlements in the Copyright 
System, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 413, 423 (2009) [hereinafter Ng, The 
Social Contract and Authorship]. 
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their intellectual labors, while recognizing the fundamental understanding 
that the public has a right to grow collectively as a society, without being 
unduly hindered by costs associated with access to the knowledge created.14  
Consequently, these philosophical underpinnings of the United States’ 
understanding of the balance between an individual’s exploitation of their 
work and public rights of access are cemented in the Federal Constitution of 
the United States.15 
Our present system devalues authors and the intrinsic value of what 
they create, while maintaining, incorrectly, an ideology that authors and 
their economic interests form the basis for the system.16  Too often under 
our present system the quality and intellectual merit of an author’s work are 
compromised for the economic value that it can generate for commercial 
interests.  Moreover, the authors themselves lack even the basic moral 
rights that authors in countries such as France, England, Germany, and Italy 
have enjoyed for, in some cases, hundreds of years.17  Furthermore, the 
United States is arguably not fulfilling its obligations under the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne 
Convention”), which specifically contains a clause asserting the validity of, 
and requiring the protection of, an author’s moral rights.18  Article 6bis of 
the Berne Convention provides: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation 
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, 
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation.19 
 
14. JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:  ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 11 
(2008) (arguing that copyright protection should exist only so long as necessary to provide an 
incentive to create, and thereafter fall into the public domain). 
15. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries” (emphasis added)). 
16. Alina Ng, The Authors Rights in Literary and Artistic Works, 9 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 459-60 (2009) (discussing the economically driven underpinnings of our 
current copyright system, and its effect on the public’s treatment of works of creative authorship) 
[hereinafter Ng, Author Rights]. 
17. See generally id.; see also Davidson, supra note 12, at 585-86 (noting among other things 
that French authors frequently defend their economic and moral rights); Rigamonti, supra note 11, 
at 353-55 (providing an overview discussion of moral rights law in French, German, and Italian 
law). 
18. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, 25 
U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
19. Id. at art. 6bis (emphasis added). 
          
2012] CREATING THE NATIONAL WEALTH 167 
The United States, when it finally acceded to the Berne Convention in 
1988, did so only after recognizing that its own efforts to protect its 
authors’ works internationally were abysmally unsuccessful.20  Even after 
acceding to the Berne Convention, the United States did so only with the 
recognition that its common law and statutory copyright protections were 
sufficient to protect an author’s moral rights, as required under the 
Convention.21  This, however, is not the case.  The national wealth, as 
embodied in our authors’ artistic achievements and products, are derided of 
their literary value in a commercialized market designed to further the 
interests of publishing distributors, not authors themselves.  Ultimately, 
under our current legal regime, the system serves to deprive the reading 
public of valuable works that would otherwise be in the public domain.22  
Additionally, this expense comes at the ironic and hypocritical cost of 
authors’ moral rights, whose interests the copyright system should have as 
its base purpose.  Thus, in order to achieve the United States’ goals under 
the Federal Constitution, our international obligations under the Berne 
treaty (part of the supreme law of the United States), and to advance society 
(all of which are embodied in our Constitutional provisions concerning 
copyright and the role of authors), we should recognize the moral and 
economic rights of authors. 
 Part II of this Article will provide a brief history of some of the major 
moments in literary copyright history from an Anglo-American 
perspective,23 and include a brief overview of the United States’ statutory 
approach to copyright protections, and subsequent amendments to the 
original Copyright Act of 1790.  Part III will discuss the role of the author 
in the life of the community, moral rights, and the importance that 
authorship has to advancing the ideas and causes of society.  Part IV will 
discuss the clash of philosophies underpinning the debate between 
economic interests, moral rights, and public rights.  It will also address the 
nature of literary publishing contracts, and the inherent inability for the so-
 
20. Davidson, supra note 12, at 587. 
21. Donald Francis Madeo, Note, Literary Creation and American Copyright Law:  Authors’ 
Wishes Hardly Resting in Peace, 5 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 179, 190-91 (1992) (discussing 
amendments to the Berne Convention designed to satisfy international requirements of moral 
rights, with United States’ law); STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 148 (4th ed. 
2012). 
22. W. Russell Taber, Note, Copyright Déjá Vu:  A New Definition of “Publication” Under 
the Copyright Act of 1909, 58 VAND. L. REV. 857, 862-63 (2005). 
23. This Article will chiefly be focused on the rights of literary authors, that is, authors 
whose works are of a written form, for example, novels, plays, poetry.  However reference will 
also be made to visual art, especially in light of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 § 106A of 
the Copyright Act [hereinafter “VARA”], to elucidate that statute’s damage to moral rights 
assertions under the common law. 
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called “carefully crafted bargain” to cure the United States’ deficiencies 
concerning authorial moral rights.  Part IV also dispels the notion that the 
current legal system is adequate to protect author’s moral rights and their 
ability to assert them. Part V will suggest three solutions to these issues:  (1) 
scaled back copyright protection terms, (2) statutory protections for 
author’s moral rights, and (3) using these statutory protections to provide 
increased bargaining power for negotiating authors. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND:  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
LITERARY COPYRIGHT LAW 
In order to understand the progression of the law surrounding literary 
contracts, one must first look to the historical development of copyright, 
and specifically to the interrelationships between booksellers, censorship, 
and statutory enactments.  Specifically, this section discusses early methods 
of publication and production followed by relevant laws and statutes 
affecting the legal background of literary contract law. 
A. FROM MEDIEVAL MANUSCRIPT COPYING TO THE PRINTING PRESS 
Prior to the introduction of the printing press in England, the work of 
copying a book had to be done by hand.24  The results were spectacular, 
gorgeously beautiful works of art in their own right, but they came at a 
significant cost, as typically a monk or other member of a professional class 
of scribes could only copy a certain number of books in a lifetime.25  With 
the introduction of the printing press by Johannes Gutenberg into the work 
of manuscript copying and publication, the number of books that could be 
printed substantially increased and had the result of simultaneously 
lowering the costs of books.26  Subsequently, William Caxton’s 
introduction of the printing press into England in 147127 had the similar 
effect of lowering the cost of books, while allowing for a proliferation of 
 
24. FRED LERNER, THE STORY OF LIBRARIES:  FROM THE INVENTION OF WRITING TO THE 
COMPUTER AGE 46 (2d ed. 2009) (describing aspects of the manuscript copying process). 
25. CHRISTOPHER DE HAMEL, SCRIBES AND ILLUMINATORS 7 (1992) (“A monk had other 
commitments as well as book production, and not only attended chapel up to eight times a day but 
also took turns in other tasks around the monastery’s school, kitchen, guest house or garden . . . .  
An eleventh-century monastic scribe, in no great haste, might achieve three or four moderate-sized 
books a year.”). 
26. Steven Kries, The Printing Press, THE HISTORY GUIDE, http://www historyguide.org/ 
intellect/press html (last updated May 13, 2004) (discussing the history of the printing press, and 
its effect on book publication). 
27. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 840; NORMAN FRANCIS BLAKE, 
WILLIAM CAXTON AND ENGLISH LITERARY CULTURE 5 (1991). 
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printers to spring up to feed the public’s growing desire for cheap literary 
texts.28  Indeed, as Benjamin Davidson notes, 
Over the span of eighty years following the printing press’s 
introduction, the guilds and their printing-age equivalents united to 
form the Stationers’ Company, which, in 1557, was granted quasi-
legislative and judicial powers to regulate the printing industry.  
The Company’s status as a royally sanctioned monopoly, allowed 
it to control which authors and what content was printed, and 
because it abided by the social order, that so preoccupied the 
monarchs, the Stationers’ Company played a critical role in the 
development of Anglo-American copyright law, ensuring that the 
interests of copyright holders would be forever subordinated to the 
public interest.29 
Accordingly, the intermix and symbiotic relationship between 
censorship, power, authority, and regulation of authorial rights emerged at 
an early date, and in tandem with the rise of new technologies, which are 
largely the precursors and foundations for our technologies of reproduction 
today.  Indeed, the power and pervasive influence exercised by subsequent 
monarchs via the Stationers’ Company helped to create the presumption 
that the only rights an author had were those of selling the manuscript itself, 
without any further rights attaching to the author after that sale.30 
The rights of booksellers, who acted as publishers and distributors of 
literary works, predominated over any claim that the author might have 
against shoddy publication work.  Literary works were often badly put 
together, incomplete, and deprived the author of any future royalty rights.  
All of those rights vested in the booksellers, who enforced their rights 
through special decrees from the secretive proceedings of the Star 
 
28. NORMAN FRANCIS BLAKE, WILLIAM CAXTON AND ENGLISH LITERARY CULTURE 5 
(2003) (noting that “[i]n England Caxton is generally honoured as the man who introduced 
printing into England”); see also Blake’s general discussion concerning selections of what Caxton 
chose to print, i.e. works that would likely please his audiences and sell many copies, but which 
were not generally held to a high literary standard. 
29. Davidson, supra note 12, at 589.  Davidson also aptly points out the psychological effect 
this had on some of the leading authors of the time, such as John Milton, whose PARADISE LOST 
remains a classic.  Id. at 592-93.  As Davidson sees it “in AEROPAGATICA, one of the first pieces by 
an author in support of authors, Milton championed authors’ individuality, but not authors’ 
rights.”  Id. at 593 (emphasis added).  But see Alina Ng, Authors and Readers:  Conceptualizing 
Authorship in Copyright Law, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 377, 390 (2008) (“In opposing 
censorship and state licensing of book printing, John Milton’s AEROPAGITICA speech elevated the 
author to a dignified creator of works, who should not be subjected to the control of printers 
through royal and ecclesiastical censorship.”). 
30. Davidson, supra note 12, at 590.  But see Alina Ng, Authors and Readers:  
Conceptualizing Authorship in Copyright Law, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 377, 390 (2008) 
[hereinafter Ng, Authors and Readers]. 
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Chamber.31  Utilizing the authority of the Star Chamber, the Stationers’ 
Company could thwart unauthorized publications, and close print shops not 
licensed by them.32  Such was the state of affairs that, as Davidson notes, 
“during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when booksellers, printers, 
monarchs, and Parliament were all vying for control of the burgeoning book 
trade, no authors asserted any rights in British courts.”33  Indeed, the Star 
Chambers’ decrees were so draconian that they permitted the banning of the 
printing of any book that conflicted with any decree promulgated under the 
secretive auspices of its orders and decrees, and went so far as to permit 
agents of the Stationers’ Company the right to search premises for material 
that would contravene the censorship laws.34 
B. THE COMMON LAW AND THE STATUTORY BEGINNING 
 OF COPYRIGHT 
Nevertheless, the Star Chamber did, eventually, grant rights to authors 
over their work, allowing it to become a form of property.35  In response, 
authors were required to sign contracts indicating their assent to the 
transferability of exclusive rights to the literary work in question to the 
publisher.36  It was not until 1709 with the Long Parliament’s passage of An 
Act for the Encouragement of Learning (“Statute of Anne”),37 however, that 
copyright protections truly accrued as a matter of right on behalf of English 
authors.  Indeed, the Statute of Anne is generally seen as the moment of 
conception for modern copyright law.38 
 
31. The Star Chamber was a secretive court enacted to deal with prominent individuals, 
whom it was thought an ordinary court could not justly try.  Its secrecy, however, without any 
procedural safeguards, gave rise to its reputation for abuses of power, and it is now primarily 
viewed as exemplifying excesses of Royal authority, and its use as a political tool to thwart 
opposition to that authority.  See, e.g., Star Chamber Definition, 
http://www.duhaime.org/legaldictionary/s/starchamber.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).  The Star 
Chamber arguably influenced our own procedural protections and safeguards under the Federal 
Constitution.  See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 595-96 (1990) (discussing the rights and 
privileges arising under the Fifth Amendment).  Accord Donaldson, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. at 841 
(“The Star Chamber was a criminal court, and had not constitutional authority to determine civil 
rights.  That court has long since been abolished, without regret; and it is the happiness of the 
subject, that the common law has flowed through purer channels.”). 
32. Davidson, supra note 12, at 591. 
33. Id. 
34. See ORDINANCE OF THE STAR CHAMBER FOR THE CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS (1566), 
reprinted in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 315, 315 (Burton 
Adams & Henry Morse Stephens eds., Macmillan 1901). 
35. Davidson, supra note 12, at 593-94. 
36. Id. at 594. 
37. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in 
the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, During the Times Therein Mentioned, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 
19 (Eng.). [hereinafter Statute of Anne]. 
38. LIOR ZERNER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT 36-37 (2007). 
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Under the Statute of Anne, authors were granted a fourteen year 
monopoly over their work, which could be renewed for an additional 
fourteen years, thus ensuring the author’s economic interests in their work 
under statutory law.39  However, two important prevailing views at the time 
of the Statute of Anne’s enactment were that (1) the publisher whom the 
author had transferred his rights to attained the perpetual copyright that the 
author had enjoyed at common law regardless of the Statute’s period of 
protection concluding, and (2) at the conclusion of the twenty-eight year 
period established then by Statute, the copyright lapsed, and any publisher 
could subsequently reprint the work without fear of violating another 
publisher’s copyright over the work.40 
1. Relevant Case Law Interpreting the Statute of Anne 
Inevitably the courts were drawn into the controversy, and were 
required to interpret the statute.  The two cases of significance dealing with 
the Statute of Anne were Millar v. Taylor,41 and Donaldson v. Beckett.42 
a. Millar v. Taylor – A Perpetual Common Law Copyright 
In Millar, the 1769 English courts dealt with issues of copyright 
involving the work of poet James Thomson.43  Andrew Millar, a bookseller, 
had acquired the rights to publish Thomson’s THE SEASONS.  Millar caused 
to be printed 2,000 copies of the work, and subsequently an additional 
1,000 copies of the work.44  Similarly, Robert Taylor, another bookseller, 
surreptitiously printed copies of the work, despite the fact that Millar still 
had quantities of the work on hand, who as a result of Taylor’s allegedly 
unauthorized reproduction subsequently suffered economic injury by his 
printing of the work.45 
However, the work in question’s copyright – THE SEASONS – had 
expired.46  Therefore, the question presented to the court was whether there 
existed, as had existed at common law, a perpetual copyright vesting to the 
author, such that a work could never enter the public domain.47  The court 
 
39. BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 11-12 (2004). 
40. Id. 
41. (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.). 
42. (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.). 
43. Millar, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. at 202. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 202-03. 
46. Id. at 206. 
47. Id. 
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found for Andrew Millar, assessing that the Statute of Anne merely codified 
the common-law rights of a perpetual copyright vesting in an author, and 
concomitantly in the publisher, Millar, to whom the poet James Thomson 
had transferred his rights.48 
b. Donaldson v. Beckett – The House of Lords Reverses 
 Course and Establishes the Modern Trend 
However, the 1774 case of Donaldson reversed Millar, and found that 
no such common law right of perpetual copyright ever existed in an author, 
and the only one that did exist was that established by statute, under the 
auspices of the Statute of Anne.49  The Donaldson case involves very 
similar facts to those at hand in Millar – the subject matter once again 
concerned the eponymous works of poet James Thomson.50  After the 
Millar case was resolved in Andrew Millar’s favor, his heirs (Andrew 
Millar died the day after the decision was rendered),51 sold some of the 
rights in Thomson’s poetry to printer Thomas Beckett.52  After acquiring 
these rights the new copyright holders filed an action against Alexander 
Donaldson who had been printing illegal copies of the poems.53  Relying on 
the decision in Millar, the Court of Chancery granted an injunction against 
Donaldson.54 
In a dramatic series of events the House of Lords convened a panel of 
Judges and submitted to them a series of questions, among them whether 
“the Statute of Anne displaced the common law cause of action or authors 
retained a perpetual property right in a copyrighted work despite statutory 
limitations.”55  The judges found that such a common law right vested in 
authors.56  However, the House of Lords rejected that finding, and instead 
 
48. Id. at 208 (“The Act supposes an ownership at common law . . . .  The sole property of 
the owner is here acknowledged in express words, as a common law right:  and the Legislature 
who passed that Act, could never have entertained the most distant idea, ‘that the productions of 
the brain were not a subject matter of property’.”  To support an action on this statute, ownership 
must be proved; or the plaintiff could not recover:  because the action is to be brought by the 
owner; who is to have a moiety of the penalty.”). 
49. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 846-47. 
50. Id. at 837-39. 
51. Millar, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. at 202. 
52. Donaldson, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. at 938. 
53. Id. at 839, 847 n.1. 
54. Millar, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. at 202. 
55. Donaldson, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. at 846-47. 
56. Id. at 847. 
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found that the common law’s perpetual copyright for literary works did not 
exist, absent the statutory rights granted by the Statute of Anne.57 
2. Effect of Millar and Donaldson 
The decision in Donaldson articulated the approaches that would form 
the criteria used in assessing issues concerning copyright, including rights 
at common law to perpetual copyrights versus limited copyrights 
established by statute.  In discussing whether a perpetual right of copyright 
could accrue under the common law, the Donaldson court, mimicking the 
Millar court, noted: 
For a right at common law must be founded on principles of 
conscience and natural justice.  Conscience and natural justice are 
not local, or municipal.  Natural justice is the same at Athens, at 
Rome, in France, Spain, and Italy.  Copies of books have existed 
in all ages and they have been multiplied; and yet an exclusive 
privilege, or the sole right of one man to multiple copies, was 
never dictated by natural justice in any age or country; and of 
course the sole liberty of vending copies could not exist of 
common right, which gives an equal benefit to all.  An exclusive 
privilege to exercise a natural faculty, is an encroachment upon the 
rights of man.58 
The remarks of the Donaldson court could not have predicted better the 
continuing debates that accompany copyright, extensions of copyrights, and 
the right of the public to have unfettered access to works that have fallen 
into the public domain.59 
What is equally compelling about the court’s decision in Donaldson, is 
that it cites none other than John Milton in support of its decision to reverse 
Millar, and finds the only rights an author has in his work are those 
established by statute, in this case, the Statute of Anne.60  The court could, 
arguably, have focused its analysis entirely on the instant legal issues at 
 
57. Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:  Exploding 
the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1157 (1983) (citing 17 PARL. 
HIST. ENG. 953, 970-71 (H.L. 1774)). 
58. Donaldson, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. at 840. 
59. The recent decision of Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), however, makes even this 
basic concept uncertain, as discussed infra. 
60. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19 (Eng.).  The Donaldson court articulates, “the 
authority of such a man as Milton is of great weight; and he is represented as speaking, after much 
consideration on the very point.  His words are, the just retaining of each man’s copy, which God 
forbid should be gainsaid.”  Donaldson, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. at 843.  The court goes on to assert 
that, “But [Milton] does not say how long the copy should be retained . . . Milton could not wish 
that PARADISE LOST, which was sold for £5 . . . should continue a splendid fortune in the hands of 
a bookseller, and his own grand-daughter be obliged to beg a charity play.”  Id.  (emphasis added). 
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hand before it, but instead it chose to recognize the force and importance of 
a spokesperson of the nation, in the form of poet John Milton.  This is an 
extraordinary use of a literary figure by a court, and similarly, the court in 
Donaldson also referenced author Jonathan Swift as a qualified source 
regarding perpetual copyrights.61 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT JURISPRUDENCE: 
 THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1790 AND WHEATON V. PETERS 
The Framers of the Constitution largely followed suit when they 
drafted the Copyright Act of 1790,62 which copied the Statute of Anne’s 
twenty-eight year maximum copyright.63  But a significant question 
remained as to whether the inclusion of the copyright clause in the Federal 
Constitution disturbed any common law rights authors might enjoy under 
the laws of the several states (including that of a perpetual copyright).64  
Indeed, in FEDERALIST NO. 43 James Madison speaks of authors enjoying a 
copyright at common law.65  Madison writes, “[t]he copyright of authors 
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common 
law.”66  The future development of American copyright law was shaped by 
both legal precedent and Congressional acts. 
1. The Case of Wheaton and the Making of United States’ 
 Copyright Jurisprudence. 
Any uncertainty as to the existence of a common law copyright vesting 
in the author, even with the presence of statutory rights, was extinguished 
with the case of Wheaton v. Peters.67  Wheaton involved the Supreme Court 
 
61. Id. (“Dr. Swift and Mr. Pultney were both clearly of opinion, that there was no common 
law right.”). 
62. Act of May 31 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 [hereinafter Copyright Act of 1790]. 
63. J.A. Lorengo, What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander:  An Argument for the 
Consistent Interpretation of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 51, 64 (2003). 
64. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE:  A 
STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 219 (2002) (“[T]he language of the first copyright statute, 
enacted in 1790, rather strongly suggests a perception by Congress that it was not creating a right 
but rather affirming and protecting an existing right.  Thus, it refers to the copyright of maps, 
charts, and books already printed within the United States and to those who have legally acquired 
the copyright of any such map, chart, book or books.  This reference to an existing ‘copyright’ is 
almost certainly to a perceived common-law right.” (citations omitted)). 
65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 220 (James Madison) (2010), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST 
PAPERS (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
66. Id.  Of course Madison would have been correct had only the Millar decision been 
rendered by the time of the enactment of the first Copyright Act of 1790.  However, it is 
indeterminate whether he was aware of the Donaldson decision. 
67. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-55 (1834). 
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reporter Henry Wheaton, who had taken care to compile substantial reports 
from the Court’s terms, along with annotations.68  The significant cost of 
these reports meant that they were beyond the reach of most lawyers.69  
Richard Peters, Wheaton’s successor as court reporter undertook to 
condense the material contained in Wheaton’s reports, and in the process 
undercut the cost of Wheaton’s reports significantly.70  Wheaton 
subsequently sued in Pennsylvania, and lost.  He subsequently appealed to 
the United States Supreme Court where he argued that he had a common 
law right of copyright ownership in his works, in perpetuity.71  This was the 
issue the Donaldson court had dealt with in 1774, and the United States 
Supreme Court arrived at essentially the same result.72  While the Court 
acknowledged that an author has certain common law rights which attach to 
his work, that is vastly different from asserting “a perpetual and exclusive 
property in the future publication of the work, after the author shall have 
published it to the world.”73  But the Court certainly went further than this 
mere acknowledgement, and foreclosed the possibility of recognizing rights 
of a moral nature, as courts in France and other civil law jurisdictions had 
been doing.74  Indeed, the Court asserts: 
[t]he argument that a literary man is as much entitled to the 
product of his labour as any other member of society, cannot be 
controverted.  And the answer is, that he realises this product by 
the transfer of his manuscripts, or in the sale of his works, when 
first published.75 
Thus, the work of the author had already, even at this early stage of 
copyright litigation in the United States, been reduced to that of 
commodity.76 
Finally, Wheaton established conclusively that the rights of authors 
regarding copyright arise by statute, and not common law.77  The Court 
noted “that Congress, then, by this act [the Copyright Act of 1790], instead 
 
68. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 593. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 654. 
72. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 846-47. 
73. Id. at 657. 
74. Davidson, supra note 12, at 609-10 (noting that after the French Revolution, courts 
started providing more recognition to the creativity of authors). 
75. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 657. 
76. Id. at 658.  (“Does not the man who imitates the machine profit as much by the labour of 
another, as he who imitates or republishes a book?  Can there be a difference between the types 
and press with which one is formed; and the instruments used in the construction of the others?”). 
77. Id. at 657-58. 
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of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it.  This seems to 
be the clear import of the law, connected with the circumstances under 
which it was enacted.”78  Thus, Wheaton established the analytic framework 
for understanding author rights arising under the copyright laws, and 
continues to stand for the premise that author rights are ones of a statutory 
nature.  Consequentially, absent a statutory grant of right for moral or other 
rights, authorial rights are not likely to be found in the common law.79 
2. Statutory Modifications to United States Copyright Law 
While the Millar decision ultimately did not yield a common law right 
to perpetual copyright in an author’s work, the United States Congress may 
have succeeded in circumventing that common law specter via statutory 
means.  Historically, since the Copyright Act of 1790, which granted a 
copyright similar to that found under the Statute of Anne of a fixed period 
of twenty-eight years (an initial term of fourteen years, with a renewable 
copyright of fourteen years), the United States Congress has consistently 
acted to extend the term of copyright protection granted under statute.80  
With the Copyright Act of 1831, Congress extended the initial copyright 
protection term to twenty-eight years, with a fourteen-year renewal, for a 
total of forty-two years.81  With the Copyright Act of 1909, Congress again 
acted to extend the term of copyright protections with an initial term of 
twenty-eight years, followed by a renewal period of twenty-eight years, for 
a total of fifty-six years.82  In the Copyright Act of 1976, the last major 
revision to the copyright laws, Congress extended the term of copyright 
protection (for works published after January 1, 1978) for fifty years 
beyond the life of the author.83  The final revision to the term protections 
under statute came with the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, which 
extended copyright protections an additional twenty years, thus extending 
 
78. Id. at 661.  Accord Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 
(1984). 
79. But see Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 381-93, 410-11 (discussing common law remedies 
that are similar in nature to moral rights, but noting the uncertainty of their fate to achieve this 
quasi-moral rights function in the aftermath of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
539 U.S. 23 (2003)). 
80. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.; see also Sue Ann Mota, Eldred v. 
Reno – Is the Copyright Term Extension Act Constitutional?, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 167, 169 
(2002); Copyright Time:  A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N OF RES. LIBRARIES, 
http://www.arl.org/pp/ppcopyright/copyresources/copytimeline.shtml (last visited Oct. 31 2012) 
(containing an extensive, and brief overview of the major copyright revisions, and cases 
interpreting copyright law since the Copyright Act of 1790). 
81. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1-2 Stat. 436, 436.  See also, ASS’N OF RES. LIBRARIES, 
supra note 80. 
82. The Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1-2, 35 Stat 1075, 1080. 
83. The Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573. 
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the protections under the Copyright Act of 1976 for the life of the author 
with an additional seventy years, and for works of corporate authorship 
either one hundred-twenty years after creation, or ninety five years after 
publication.84 
What remains striking about Congress’ intent to protect the rights of 
authors is its persistent resistance to fulfilling its mandate under the Berne 
Convention to provide meaningfully for the moral rights of authors.85  This 
approach serves only the interests of those who have powerful incentives to 
maintain a stranglehold on innovation by commercializing what is readily 
adaptable for consumption, based on a faulty market-based approach that 
values product-value over literary and artistic merit, discussed infra.86 
3. Defining Authorship and Moral Rights 
Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson point out, “[l]ike ‘context,’ 
‘authorship’ is an elaborate work of framing, something we elaborately 
produce rather than something we simply find.”87  Thus, authorship, moral 
rights, and the role of the author in society are inextricably linked.  This 
section discusses these important interrelationships, and the important role 
of the author in society. 
a. Role of Authorship 
In his seminal 1969 essay What is an Author?, cultural theorist Michel 
Foucault articulates a theory by which the function of the author is 
subsumed beneath the larger functions of language that enable the 
community to operate as a discourse.88  Thus, the function of the author 
after assembling the final literary work is to disseminate it, at which point 
the author ceases to exist.89  Foucault writes, 
The author – or what I have called the ‘author-function’ – is 
undoubtedly only one of the possible specifications of the subject 
and, considering past historical transformations, it appears that the 
form, the complexity, and even the existence of this function are 
 
84. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 
2827 (1998). 
85. Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights:  Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 416-
21 (2009). 
86. Ng, Author Rights, supra note 16, at 459-62. 
87. Mieke Bal & Norman Bryson, Semiotics and Art History:  A Discussion of Context and 
Senders, in THE ART OF ART HISTORY:  A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 243, 252 (Donald Preziosi ed., 
2009). 
88. Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in THE ART OF ART HISTORY:  A CRITICAL 
ANTHOLOGY 321, 324 (Donald Preziosi ed., 2009). 
89. Id. 
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far from immutable.  We can easily imagine a culture where 
discourse would circulate without any need for an author.90 
In Foucault’s view, the author hardly stands as an iconic figure, absent 
societal recognition of the author as such.91  Instead the author’s work 
becomes a series of discourses by which we each communicate with one 
another in the community.92  Such literary theories of understanding 
authorship have ebbed and flowed in the academy, and much postmodern 
literary theory seeks to elucidate and capture the essence of authorship and 
discourse, often through a cultural perspective.93 
But for the Framers of the Constitution, authors were individuals, and 
their work had social significance as well as personal significance.  Thus, 
when one examines the copyright clause of the Federal Constitution, one 
sees the significance of the functional value of author as author, “by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors.”94  The Federal 
Constitution clearly connects the idea of limited, exclusive rights to authors 
and inventors.  Of course, as modern evolution of literary and other 
creations has shown, such authors and inventors often take the shape of the 
corporate body, as opposed to a natural person.95 
Literary writers perform an important societal function, however.  They 
are a source of national pride and a symbol of influence around the world.96  
And the process by which poets and writers arrive at their literary creations 
is an arduous task, requiring the author to go into himself and recover from 
the depths of his psyche the mappings of a novel, poem, or play that 
examines, mirrors, and questions the contours of society.  Indeed, as 
Coleridge declared, “I see, not feel, how beautiful they are . . . .  I may not 
hope from outward forms to win, the Passion & the Life, whose Fountains 
are within.”97  The author stands as an individual in relation to the entire 
 
90. Id. at 333. 
91. See, e.g., JAMES A. MACKIN, COMMUNITY OVER CHAOS:  AN ECOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON COMMUNICATION ETHICS 22-23 (1997). 
92. Id. 
93. Cf. Elana Gomel, Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, and the (Un)Death of the 
Author, NARRATIVE, at 74-92 (Jan. 2004) (for a general approach to discussing issues of 
authorship from a theoretical and postmodern situationalism). 
94. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
95. Paige Gold, Fair Use and the First Amendment:  Corporate Control of Copyright is 
Stifling Documentary-Making and Thwarting the Aims of the First Amendment, 15 U. BALT. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 21-23 (2006). 
96. KIM C. STURGESS, SHAKESPEARE AND THE AMERICAN NATION 184 (2004). 
97. JOHN WORTHEN, THE GANG:  COLERIDGE, THE HUTCHINSONS & THE WORDSWORTHS IN 
1802, at 153 (2001). 
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community, and through the creative process is able to distill and unfold the 
spectrum of society, its errors, failings, pathos, and possibilities.98 
One can hardly think of England without recognizing the names of 
Shakespeare, and Chaucer, or of France without thinking of Voltaire or 
Sartre.99  Even in the United States, most individuals are apt to know the 
legendary figure of Ernest Hemingway as big-game hunter, or his work THE 
OLD MAN AND THE SEA, or Mark Twain’s HUCKLEBERRY FINN.100  And 
the enduring importance of J.D. Salinger’s THE CATCHER IN THE RYE 
cannot be overstated.101  The significance authors have to expose readers in 
a particular community to each other is one of the foundational roles an 
author serves – they help to explain and create fictions that we can then 
adapt into our own lives, and ultimately make into our own stories.  In 
short, literature helps us to see one another, despite the inescapability of our 
own prison-houses of perspective. 
b. Development of Moral Rights in Law 
Despite the shared relations that the United States and Europe have had 
since the founding of the Nation, very little of that shared history has 
translated itself into an acceptance of moral rights in the United States.102  
Moral rights (also known as droit moral) essentially recognize that a work 
of literary art is inseparable from the personality of the author, and thus, the 
author’s fundamental connection in the work cannot be severed by merely 
transferring the copyrightable interests of their work.103  Instead, while the 
publisher or other buyer of the work buys the right to reproduce the work, 
the author continues to maintain a connection to the work, recognized by 
 
98. See Norman Holland, The Power (?) of Literature:  A Neuropsychological View, NEW 
LITERARY HISTORY, Summer 2004, at 395-99 (discussing Coleridge, poetic insight, aesthetics, 
and reader response to literature). 
99. See Donald Morris, In Search of Lost Time, TIME (Nov. 21, 2007), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1686532,00 html (discussing the identity of 
France as bound up in its cultural establishment [including writers], and its subsequent decline in 
recent time). 
100. See, e.g., Magazine Cover – Ernest Hemingway (Dec. 13, 1954), TIME, 
http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19541213,00.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2012); 
Picturing Hemingway, http://www npg.si.edu/exh/hemingway/ess-index2 htm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2012); see also Adam Gopnik, The Man in the White Suit, NEW YORKER, Nov. 29, 2010, at 78. 
101. Jonathan Yardley, J.D. Salinger’s Holden Caufield, Aging Gracelessly, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 19, 2004, at C01.  As well, the significance of THE CATCHER IN THE RYE might also be seen 
in the fact that from 1990-1999 it was the tenth most challenged (banned) book in classrooms.  
100 Most Frequently Challenged Books:  1990-1999, AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/ 
ala/issuesadvocacy/banned/frequentlychallenged/challengedbydecade/1990_1999/index.cfm (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2011). 
102. Davidson, supra note 12, at 585-86. 
103. Id. at 620. 
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vested moral rights interests.104  The four traditional categories of moral 
rights are the rights of attribution, integrity, disclosure, and withdrawal.  
Specifically, the right of attribution, sometimes called the right of paternity, 
recognizes the right (or not) of the author to choose to have their name 
attached to their work.105  An author’s right to reject the gross modification 
or distortion of their work, even after transferring their copyrightable 
interests to another, is referred to as the right of integrity.106  The right of 
disclosure allows the author to decide when the work is ready to be released 
to the public.107  Finally, the right of withdrawal allows an author to decide 
that the work is no longer representative of the author, and so demand that 
the work be withdrawn from the commercial marketplace.108  Despite 
claims moral rights are already protected under United States law, the 
United States’ resistance to the Berne Convention evidences this deep 
mistrust and aversion to moral rights.109 
i. History of the Berne Convention 
The Berne Convention, initially completed in 1886, is a multilateral 
treaty that is a major success in internationalizing and unifying protections 
for works of literary and artistic expression.  The underlying purpose of the 
Berne Convention is to “demand that each member state accord to nationals 
of other members the same level of copyright protection as it accords its 
own nationals.”110  Thus, an author who publishes a work in France, and 
who subsequently transfers certain rights to a publisher in the United States, 
would presumably, absent an agreement to the contrary, retain their moral 
rights in that literary work, despite the United States’ non-adherence to 
moral rights as specified, pursuant to the Berne Convention.  The Berne 
Convention places authors at the center of its underlying purpose and 
protections, indicating “[t]he countries of the Union, being equally 
animated by the desire to protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as 
possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.”111  The 
 
104. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1091-92 (2003). 
105. Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 363-64. 
106. Id. at 364. 
107. Id. at 362. 
108. Id. at 362-63. 
109. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 
2853; see also Bird, supra note 85, at 408-09.  As of 2013, there were 166 signatory states to the 
Berne Convention.  See Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. http://wipo.int/treaties/ 
en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
110. MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 4.03 (5th ed. 2006). 
111. Berne Convention, supra note 18, pmbl. 
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history leading up to the Convention makes this focus of the treaty even 
more understandable.  Indeed, it is unsurprising that the Berne 
Convention’s central motivation is the protection of author rights, as the 
initial meetings which led to the actual negotiations of the Convention were 
led by none other than Victor Hugo, who presided as president of the 
l’Association littéraire et artistique internationale.112 
For over a hundred years the United States refused to accede to the 
Berne Convention.  One of the major issues on which the United States 
could not agree was the acceptance of moral rights, as embodied in Article 
6bis of the Berne Convention.113  Indeed, as Amelia Vetrone notes, 
In 1886, at the first signing of the Berne Treaty, the U.S. 
representative was perfectly honest about the reasons the U.S. was 
not signing the treaty.  He issued a general declaration stating that, 
while the U.S. agreed in principal with the idea of international 
copyright protection, it saw immense obstacles to achieving it, 
particularly the threat posed to American manufacturing interests 
involved in the production of copyright works.114 
This is because the United States’ interests at the time in pirating works of 
British authors, among others, was too profitable to relinquish.115  
Significantly, new technologies in the earlier part of the twentieth century 
made it increasingly difficult to agree on revisions of copyright law, 
including those relating to the Berne Convention.116  In 1988, not being a 
member of the Berne Convention made it increasingly difficult for the 
United States to protect its global economic interests, especially with the 
advent of videocassette piracy.117  In an effort to protect the United States 
against global piracy of its creative works, it acceded to the Berne 
Convention.118  Limiting the application of the treaty provisions, the United 
States stipulated that its copyright laws and the common law sufficiently 
 
112. AMELIA VETRONE, THE LEGAL AND MORAL RIGHTS OF ALL ARTISTS 21 (2003); see 
also ARNOLD P. LUTZKER, CONTENT RIGHTS FOR CREATIVE PROFESSIONALS:  COPYRIGHTS AND 
TRADEMARKS IN A DIGITAL AGE 158 (2d ed. 2002) (“The Berne Convention was inspired by 
Victor Hugo and the French intellectuals of the mid-19th century, who believed the individual 
author was being denied fair economic return on the fruits of his or her creativity.”). 
113. LUTZKER, supra note 112, at 160. 
114. VETRONE, supra note 112, at 49. 
115. Id. at 49-50.  (“As it turned out, the United States was the most prolific copyright pirate 
in the world.  It not only refused to enact any laws to protect foreign authors, but it actually 
appeared to encourage piracy.  It seems that for one hundred years after the enactment of the first 
copyright statute in this country, American publishers were printing and selling copies of books by 
foreign authors, particularly British authors, without paying any royalties to them.”). 
116. Id. at 49-51. 
117. Id. at 52. 
118. EPSTEIN, supra note 110, § 4.03. 
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protected the interests identified in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, 
such that it need not be bound by that provision.119  Moreover, because it 
was classified as a non-self-executing treaty, the Berne Convention needed 
to be implemented by act of Congress in order to become enforceable 
law.120 
The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 specifically 
disavows Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.121  Section 3(b) of the 
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 states: 
(b)  CERTAIN RIGHTS NOT AFFECTED. – The provisions of the 
Berne Convention, the adherence of the United States thereto, and 
satisfaction of United States obligations thereunder, do not expand 
or reduce any right of an author of a work, whether claimed under 
Federal, State, or the common law – (1) to claim authorship of the 
work; or (2) to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the work, 
that would prejudice the author’s honor or reputation.122 
Thus, the effect of section 3(b) of the Berne Convention Implementation 
Act of 1988 effectively froze the status quo of author rights in the United 
States. 
ii. The Promise and Reality of Moral Rights in the 
 United States 
Moral rights, absent narrow provisions in state legislation and Visual 
Artist Rights Act [VARA], are not recognized in the United States.123  
While commentators and the United States Congress sought to distance 
itself from the idea that it was not fully complying with Berne when it 
acceded to the treaty, these promises have, arguably, proved illusory.  If the 
 
119. See Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention:  A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. 
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM. VLA-J.L. & ARTS 655, 655 (1985) (noting that 
the United States’ compliance with article 6bis of the Berne Convention was likely due more to 
non-compliance by other Berne signatories, than United States common law or other statutory law 
satisfying its requirements); see also VETRONE, supra note 112, at 51 (noting the powerful 
corporate media interests who lobbied the United States Congress against adopting Article 6bis of 
the Berne Convention). 
120. Berne Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat. 2853, 2853; 
JOHN MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 468 (5th ed. 2007). 
121. Berne Implementation Act of 1988, § 3(b)(1)-(2). 
122. Id. 
123. See generally Visual Artist Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).  The scope of 
protection afforded under VARA is limited, and only applies to visual works of art.  Id.  However, 
it does represent a limited attempt to introduce Federally protected moral rights for unique, artistic 
creations. 
          
2012] CREATING THE NATIONAL WEALTH 183 
United States was, in fact, in compliance with the Berne Convention, and 
truly believed its laws compatible with the requirements under Article 6bis 
of the Berne Convention, then why take such concerted effort to distance 
itself from the language and effects of that provision of the treaty?  The 
most logical answer is that such rights are simply not yet fully compatible 
with the way business is done in the United States.  Instead, the United 
States’ system of copyright commodifies the author’s work, such that when 
authors transfer their copyright in their work, any subsequent rights they 
might have concerning that work take second-class status to the economic 
primacy of exploitation of their creative works.124 
However, the United States relentlessly suggested in its ratification that 
it was in compliance with the Berne Convention by relying primarily on 
existing copyright laws (then the Copyright Law of 1976) and the common 
law of the United States. 
However, this specious suggestion that the common law of the United 
States is sufficient to protect moral rights undermines the Berne 
Convention, and offers an illusory salve to authors seeking to effectuate 
their moral rights.  Specifically, the Berne Convention, as an international 
treaty, executed under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and 
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, is the law of every 
state of the United States.125  However, the common law of the United 
States is particular to every state in the Union, and thus subject to the 
whims of that particular forum state’s interpretation of its own laws as they 
apply to the Berne Convention.126  Such an understanding of common law 
and copyright was early established in Wheaton, which forcefully declared 
that there was no federal common law, especially as it pertained to 
copyright.127  Thus, the United States’ approach to the Berne Convention is 
arguably one that does great disservice to that treaty’s desire for uniformity 
in the protection of author rights.128  By allowing piecemeal development 
under the common law, with the various predilections of various forums to 
approach the Berne Convention and the United States’ obligations under 
them as they pertain (or don’t) to moral rights, seems a particularly 
 
124. See Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author 
Autonomy:  A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 368-70 (1993) [hereinafter Netanel, 
Copyright Alienability Restrictions]. 
125. U.S. CONST., art. 6, § 2. 
126. See, e.g., William P. Johnson, Understanding Exclusion of the CISG:  A New Paradigm 
of Determining Party Intent, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 213, 215 (2011) (discussing the imprecise analysis 
by state and federal courts of the binding, by virtue of the Federal Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”)). 
127. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-55 (1834). 
128. Berne Convention, supra note 18, pmbl. 
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haphazard way to enforce an international treaty, with uniformity at its 
heart. 
The VARA, enacted in 1990, explicitly does establish moral rights in 
extraordinarily limited circumstances.129  Under VARA, visual authors only 
have (and, indeed can only claim such rights during their lifetimes), the 
right of attribution and integrity, and not the other traditional rights of 
disclosure and withdrawal.130  This Act suggests that moral rights are not 
adequately guaranteed under the common law, nor under the provisions of 
United States copyright law.  Further, the limited amount of authors to 
which this act applies, including only those who create a visual work 
produced in small quantities, serves as a considerable statement of the 
continuing vitality of resistance to moral rights on a larger scale, and 
ultimately a frustration of the Berne Convention.131  Even under the 
substantial proscriptions under VARA, and its concomitant protections for 
visual authors, there have been significant limitations imposed.132 
Moral rights stand as separate rights from those arising under 
traditional Anglo-American views of copyright.133  This is why looking to 
doctrines of tort and contract law, while potentially powerful devices to 
cure breaches of an author’s agreement with their publisher, or to protect 
against personal defamation or other significant violations of the author’s 
work, are arguably insufficient compared to the protections served by moral 
rights.  This is particularly evident when Anglo-American views of 
copyright are compared to the moral rights authors are entitled to under the 
Berne Convention, or in foreign jurisdictions such as France and 
Germany.134  In the final analysis, the approach that the United States has 
 
129. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).  See also EPSTEIN, supra note 110, § 4.03 (“Since [the 
enactment of Berne Convention], the U.S. Congress has enacted explicit “moral rights” 
protections for a limited class of visual artists.  However artists not covered by this statute, 
including creators of literary, musical, and audio visual works, must continue to look to other 
sources of U.S. law to protect these interests.  The language of The Berne Convention 
Implementation Act explicitly states that membership in the Convention is not evidence of a 
recognition by the U.S. of a higher degree of moral rights protection than that already afforded by 
the Copyright Act.”). 
130. Id.; see Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 356. 
131. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:”  Narrative’s Implications for Moral 
Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 26-32 (2001). 
132. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that 
VARA did not apply to site-specific work of artist in park, thus allowing removal of a sculpture); 
see also Daniel Grant, When Creator and Owner Clash, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703447004575449793518169052 html?KEYWO
RDS=ascalon. 
133. See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in 
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 24-26 (1992) 
[hereinafter Netanel, United States and Continental Copyright Law]; see also, Ng, The Social 
Contract and Authorship, supra note 13, at 463-65. 
134. Netanel, United States and Continental Copyright Law, supra note 133, at 23-48. 
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taken reflecting both its historic and contemporary unwillingness to adopt 
robust provisions pertaining to moral rights, and its enactment of the narrow 
VARA protections for a limited group of artists, does little more than to 
exemplify an approach that demeans the culturally important position that 
creators of artistic works of literary merit ought to occupy in the collective 
intellectual and cultural wealth of the nation, in favor of one which values at 
its core commercialization. 
III. ECONOMIC, MORAL, AND PUBLIC INTERESTS, AND THE 
ROLE OF THE LITERARY CONTRACT 
An astonishing number of new books and reprints of previously 
published books are published in the United States each year.135  
Accordingly, as literary contracts are then negotiated in such a large 
capacity in the United States, this section addresses the need to consider 
various rights to which authors are entitled, relevant case law, and the 
further role of literary contracts. 
A. ECONOMICS, MORAL RIGHTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The debate in this country turns on the interests between economic, 
moral, and public rights.  Typically this debate is framed in terms of John 
Locke’s theory of labor and ownership, a form of natural rights theory, for 
which a more modern understanding is that of an author possessing a series 
of rights under the collective umbrella of the work of literature itself.136  
Locke argued that whenever an individual puts his own creative forces into 
nature and produces something, then the rights of ownership in the thing 
produced naturally accrue to him as a result of those independent labors.137  
This view does not conflict with the theory arising under modern economics 
which puts the locus of interest on the contractual arrangement between a 
seller of goods (the work of literature) and a buyer of those goods (the 
distributor).  It is only natural that such a transfer of ownership, or the rights 
to use those goods, necessarily entails a right of use that might preclude the 
original seller (the author) of doing what he would potentially have liked to 
have done with the thing sold, subsequent to the transaction.  However, 
 
135. See, e.g., Bowker-Publishing Market Shows Steady Title Growth in 2011 Fueled 
Largely by Self-Publishing Sector, BOWKER (June 5, 2012), http://www.bowker.com/en-
US/aboutus/press_room/2012/pr_06052012.shtml.  Even excluding the high amount of self-
publishing reported, the number of literary works published is amazingly high.  Particularly given 
the declining levels of readership in this digital age).  But see Caleb Crain, Twilight of the Books, 
NEW YORKER (Dec. 24, 2007), http://www newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2007/12/24/ 
071224crat_atlarge_crain. 
136. See Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship, supra note 13, at 459-61. 
137. Id. at 459. 
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nothing thus far stated regarding these transactions is in direct conflict with 
moral rights, unless the ultimate buyer of the work wishes to use it in a way 
that is deleterious to the author’s reputation, or the integrity of the work 
itself. 
All of the aforementioned moral rights, embody traditional moral 
rights:  (1) the author of a work has an inseparable interest, and absolute 
right to have their name attached (or not) to their personal creation; and (2) 
the work itself has some inviolate attribute that no one, except the author, 
should be able to manipulate.  In doing either of these things, the intrinsic 
(though not necessarily commercial) value of the work is (potentially) 
destroyed, or irredeemably distorted, and potentially the author’s ability to 
claim the work as their own is diminished or precluded, because the author 
can no longer truly take an authentic sense of ownership in the work.138  Of 
course these rights could potentially be seen as injurious to economic 
returns, because under a moral rights theory regime the author retains a 
vested interest in the work that could infringe upon the distributor’s ability 
to use the work in a particular way that it would like, but one for which the 
author might have a valid claim (under a moral rights regime) to block 
through injunctive relief, or to prevail in a cause for damages.  This is not 
necessarily a negative thing, even though we are so often accustomed to 
seeing issues through an economically oriented paradigm, and so often 
recognize short-term values as more substantial than long-term ones.139 
The long-term value in having works of art that have their integrity, 
and attribution of the author intact, are manifold.  They ensure that the work 
of the artistic creator whose creation is to be distributed into the commons 
of knowledge is one that meets with the author’s expectations, and that the 
work is as the author intended it.  That is not to say that works could not be 
improved once they enter the stream of commerce, but the value and 
primacy of intellectual products of the nation’s artists and writers has, in the 
long-term, greater value than that which is motivated by improvement for 
short-term commercial gains.140 
No other author embodies this approach better than William 
Shakespeare.  He is well known around the world, his plays are consistently 
(and often) performed, edition after edition of his work continues to appear, 
and he is deceased, thus unable to enjoy the economic or public 
remunerations from his remarkable work, especially since all of his creative 
 
138. Id. at 486-88 (discussing “authentic authorship”); see also Ng, Authors and Readers, 
supra note 30, at 400-03. 
139. Id. at 415. 
140. Cf. Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship, supra note 13, at 493-94 (noting potential 
dangers when authors create without an authentic or ethical end). 
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works are in the public domain.  How many careers in theater, cinema, 
academia, and the infinite series of subsidiary industries his works have 
created is unknown, but the integrity of his works is one that continues to be 
fiercely protected by scholars devoted to his life and career.141  He is as 
much a national treasure of Great Britain, and a symbol of the height of 
intellectual achievement, as he is an extraordinary addition to the Western 
canon of English literature.142  Yet, in Shakespeare’s own lifetime he seems 
to have cared little about the editions that were churned out of his works, 
much to the disgruntlement of scholars who try to piece together what is 
Shakespeare, from what is not.143  And while we have no knowledge of 
what Shakespeare’s approach would have been to moral rights, the long-
term value that has accrued over the centuries concerning his work is that 
they have far more social, aesthetic, and commercial worth intact in their 
integrity, and attributed to him, than if they were just passing works of 
literature that had been relentlessly distorted for profit, without an author.  
Commercialization, in the short-term, is by its nature not designed to work 
for the benefit of the long-term values of the community, or the intrinsic 
literary merit of a work of art.144 
The Framers recognized the importance of these long-term interests of 
society over the short-term value of commercial interests when they drafted 
 
141. A more contemporary example of this rigorous debate occurred with a claim by scholar 
Donald Foster (known for his use of computer analysis in ascertaining authorship), of the 
discovery of a new poem, that he attributed to Shakespeare.  See William S. Niederkorn, A 
Scholar Recants on His ‘Shakespeare’ Discovery, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2002), 
http://query nytimes.com/gst/fullpage html?res=9903E5DD143FF933A15755C0A9649C8B63. 
142. Stephen Greenblatt, one of the foremost literary scholars of our era suggests in his 
biography of Shakespeare, WILL AND THE WORLD:  HOW SHAKESPEARE BECAME SHAKESPEARE 
12 (2005) that, “This is a book, then, about an amazing success story that has resisted explanation:  
it aims to discover the actual person who wrote the most important body of imaginative literature 
of the last thousand years.”  And Shakespeare’s contemporary rival, the important English poet 
Ben Jonson, wrote in a prefatory poem to the First Folio that, “He was not of an age, but for all 
time!” 
143. Debates center not only on what works have actually been authored, or which have not, 
but also who ought to be ascribed authorship to the works that we typically attribute to 
Shakespeare as Shakespeare.  See, e.g, Robert McCrum, Review:  Shakespeare Revealed, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2007/apr/22/classics.biography.  
See generally Printing Shakespeare, BRITISH LIBRARIES, http://www.bl.uk/treasures/shakespeare/ 
printingshakes html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011); BRIAN VICKERS, COUNTERFEITING 
SHAKESPEARE:  EVIDENCE, AUTHORSHIP, AND JOHN FORD’S FUNERALL ELEGYE (2002); see also 
Jess Bravin, Justice Stevens Renders an Opinion on Who Wrote Shakespeare’s Plays, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 18, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123998633934729551 html. 
144. Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions, supra note 124, at 441.  “Schopenhauer 
believed that, ‘[w]riting for money and reservation of copyright are, at bottom, the ruin of 
literature.  No one writes anything worth writing, unless he writes entirely for the sake of his 
subject.”  Id. (quoting Arthur Schopenhauer, On Authorship, in ESSAYS 13 (T. Bailey Saunders 
trans., 1951)). 
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the Federal Constitution’s copyright clause.145  Following in the formidable 
footsteps of their British counterparts, they sought to provide for limited 
terms of protection for original authorial creations, like works of literary 
art.146  Those protections walked the fine line between valuing the 
individual’s right to economic exploitation of the fruits of his intellectual 
labor, while acknowledging the fundamental and overriding interest the 
public has to advancing – in effect – the wealth of the nation.147  In 
assessing these three interests:  economic, moral rights, and the public 
interest in knowledge, the Framers made an implicit recognition that 
knowledge never (or at least should never) halt at a particular place, never 
to develop or grow again, but rather that each contribution by each author 
was a further step in the overall process to civilization’s growth and 
development.148  However, this process has arguably been stunted by the 
relentless commercialization of the literary marketplace at the expense of 
works of literary art.149  And it has done so at the expense of author’s moral 
rights, which seems untenable, given the larger societal interests that the 
community has in the collective wealth of intellectual achievements and 
creations of its authors. 
B. FORECLOSING THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES:  DASTAR, 
 ELDRED, AND GOLAN 
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court laid the foundation for future 
moral rights litigation involving authors and their creative works.  In three 
distinct opinions, the court shaped the current role of literary contracts.  The 
following text discusses the background and effect of those decisions. 
 
145. Davidson, supra note 12, at 602-03.  “When the Founding Fathers drafted the 
Constitution, their purpose in including the Copyright clause was to implement, as the British had, 
a ‘public benefit rationale for copyright protection.’”  (quoting Craig W. Dallon, The Problem 
with Congress and Copyright Law:  Forgetting the Past and Ignoring Public Interest, 44 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 365, 423 (2004)). 
146. Id. 
147. Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright:  A Conceptual Framework for Copyright 
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1315-16 (2003). 
148. Cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984) 
(“In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . two questions:  First, how much will the 
legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and, second, how much will the 
monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?  The granting of such exclusive rights, under the 
proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the 
temporary monopoly.” (citations omitted)). 
149. Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne 
Convention:  A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 1214-15 
(2002). 
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1. Dastar – Closing the Door to Moral Rights Claims 
The issue of moral rights, copyright, and length of copyright protection 
terms are inextricably intertwined.  Each represents aspects of the economic 
interests of the author and distributor, the moral interests of the author, and 
the public’s interest in the protection of works, chiefly, though not 
exclusively as:  economic (author and distributor), moral (author), and 
length of protection (public).  Accordingly, some commentators have 
suggested that while moral rights are not explicitly recognized as a cause of 
action under United States law, certain aspects of the common law, or other 
statutes might be used to prevail in a way that provides a cause of action 
similar to that of moral rights.150  Two important moral rights – attribution 
and integrity – attained a kind of quasi-enforceable status in the United 
States, under the Lanham Act.151  The Lanham Act protects consumers 
against false or misleading advertising, and also includes protections 
against trademark infringement, and trademark dilution.152  The provisions 
for which authors seeking a cause of action for attribution and integrity 
were invoked under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.153 
As Natalie C. Suhl notes, these provisions of the Lanham Act had been 
invoked because, 
Moral Rights protection is limited in the United States, where the 
only viable course of action for non-visual authors is through the 
Lanham Act. Regarding both the Right of Attribution and the 
Right of Integrity, the Lanham Act provides only limited 
protection. . . . Thus, authors garner protection only where overt 
mutilations occur to the extent that the character of the work is 
changed so as to present a false designation of origin.  Mutilation 
 
150. See generally Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests:  The Concordance of 
Copyright Law and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 601, 618-32 (2001). 
151. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2006). 
152. Id. 
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(“(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or 
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of 
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which – (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, 
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person 
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”). 
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of a work, therefore, which does not confuse the public’s view of 
its origin, would not be actionable under the Lanham Act.154 
Thus, under these provisions of the Lanham Act, works which were 
distorted to a point which might cause deception, or which had purported a 
source of false origin might run afoul of the Lanham Act and subsequently 
achieve the fulfillment of quasi-moral rights enforcement.  Such moral 
rights were otherwise almost elusively evaded by the United States 
Congress despite its accession to the Berne Convention. 
The Supreme Court in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp Corp.,155 however, effectively ended the use of the Lanham Act to 
achieve this purpose, and in the process significantly closed the door to 
other moral rights claims under other bodies of national law.156  In Dastar, 
the Supreme Court faced the question of “whether § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), prevents the unaccredited copying of a work.”157  
The facts in Dastar surrounded the use of a television series, “Crusade in 
Europe,” that had been based on a book by General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower.158  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation (“Fox”) had been 
granted exclusive television rights to create the series “Crusade in Europe,” 
based upon Eisenhower’s books.159  It in turn contracted with Time, Inc. to 
produce the series, and Time in turn assigned its copyright to the series it 
produced to Fox.160  The filmed series included footage created by members 
of the United States military forces, the British Ministry of Information, and 
other cameramen.161  While the publisher Doubleday, of General 
Eisenhower’s book, CRUSADE IN EUROPE, renewed its copyright prior to its 
expiration, Fox did not renew their copyright to the television series 
“Crusade in Europe.”162  Thus, the copyright held by Fox to the television 
series lapsed, and entered the public domain in 1977.163  “In 1988, Fox 
reacquired the television rights in General Eisenhower’s book, including the 
exclusive right to distribute the Crusade television series on video and to 
sublicense others to do so.”164  In 1995 “Dastar released a video set entitled 
 
154. Suhl, supra note 149, at 1203. 
155. 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
156. Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 409-12 (discussing the effect that Dastar has had on other 
potential claims for moral rights, under other bodies of law). 
157. Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 25. 




162. Id. at 26. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
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World War II Campaigns in Europe.”165  To make “World War II 
Campaigns in Europe,” Dastar purchased tapes of the original version of the 
“Crusade in Europe” television series, copied them, and subsequently edited 
them.166  As part of this process, they made the series significantly shorter 
than the original, and inserted a variety of modest changes, including voice 
over narrations, and a new credits page.167 
Fox subsequently brought an action asserting that Dastar’s sale of its 
own video series (based substantially on the original “Crusade in Europe” 
series), had infringed Doubleday’s copyright in General Eisenhower’s 
book, and thus, subsequently, Fox’s exclusive television rights, which 
flowed from the book, without proper attribution, thus constituted “reverse 
passing off,” actionable under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.168  The 
District Court found for Fox on all of the counts of its allegations, and 
judgment was subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
who in their analysis of the issue concluded, “Dastar copied substantially 
the entire Crusade in Europe series created by Twentieth Century Fox, 
labeled the resulting product with a different name and marked it without 
attribution to Fox [, and] therefore committed a ‘bodily appropriation’ of 
Fox’s series.”169 
Dastar then was essentially a moral rights claim, masquerading as a 
trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act.  And the Supreme 
Court correctly identified it as such in a unanimous opinion.170  The opinion 
was written by Justice Antonin Scalia, reversing the judgment of the Ninth 
Circuit, concluding: 
[A]s used in the Lanham Act, the phrase ‘origin of goods’ is in our 
view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the 
ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.  Such an 
extension would not only stretch the text, but it would be out of 
accord with the history and purpose of the Lanham Act and 
inconsistent with precedent.171 
What the Court did was to make clear to prospective litigants that claims 
and remedy for attribution are to be found in copyright law, and not under 





168. Id. at 27. 
169. Id. at 27-28 (emphasis added). 
170. Id. at 38 (noting that Justice Breyer did not take part in the consideration of the case). 
171. Id. at 32. 
172. Id. at 32-35; see also Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 410. 
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Court noted that “[t]he rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a 
‘carefully crafted bargain,’ . . . under which, once the patent or copyright 
monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and 
without attribution.”173  Finally, the Court effectively closed the door to any 
moral rights claims, attempting to establish themselves under a quasi-
common law rights claim.  In discussing Fox’s claim under the Lanham 
Act, Scalia made mention of VARA, writing, 
When Congress has wished to create such an addition to the law of 
copyright, it has done so with much more specificity than the 
Lanham Act’s ambiguous use of ‘origin.’  The Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990 . . . [provides for an] express right of 
attribution [and] is carefully limited and focused . . . Recognizing 
in § 43(a) a cause of action for misrepresentation of authorship of 
noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) would render these 
limitations superfluous.  A statutory interpretation that renders 
another statute superfluous is of course to be avoided.174 
Scalia’s reference to VARA suggested that absent express Congressional 
creation of statutory rights for copyright (which it presumably would do so 
expressly and statutorily), the courts are not the venue for the establishment 
of these rights.  This interpretation necessarily suggests that Congress’ 
assurances that the common law and other laws of the United States are 
sufficient to meet the requirements of the Berne Convention will be hollow, 
in that courts will now look closely to see if the rights being asserted are of 
a moral nature, and thus excluded (absent the narrow provisions under 
VARA) from compensability, if pursued as a claim arising under 
copyright.175  Of course such a result is not entirely surprising, given the 
declaration by the Court in Wheaton that rights of holders arising under 
copyright law are necessarily statutory, and thus within the purview of 
Congress, and not the common law.176  All of this reinforces the underlying 
recognition that allusions to other law and common law for the protection 
of specific rights, in this case authorial moral rights, is no substitution for 
statutory law intended to effectuate that purpose. 
 
173. Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 33-35 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 
489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989)). 
174. Id. at 34-35 
175. See Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 410. 
176. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-55 (1834). 
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2. Eldred – An Erosion of the Public Interest 
The case to consider in tandem with Dastar is Eldred v. Ashcroft,177 
which involved a challenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 
(“CTEA”), on grounds that it exceeded Congress’s authority under the 
copyright clause of the Federal Constitution and also violated the First 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.178  The CTEA granted extensions 
on copyright terms in the United States by twenty years.179  Thus, it 
extended works copyrighted by natural authors from the life of the author, 
and fifty years, to the life of the author and seventy years.180  Works of 
corporate authorship were also extended to either one hundred and twenty 
years after their creation or ninety-five years after their publication.181  The 
bill was subsequently passed by a voice vote in both houses of Congress, 
and signed into law by then President William Clinton.182  In Eldred, the 
petitioners argued, inter alia, “the CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights 
does not ‘promote the Progress of Science’ as contemplated by the 
preambular language of the Copyright Clause. . . . they maintain that the 
preambular language identifies the sole end to which Congress may 
legislate.”183  Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and six other Justices 
rejected the Petitioner’s argument claiming the CTEA was 
unconstitutional.184  Instead they found such authority to determine 
copyright terms and limits vests solely in Congress.  “As petitioners point 
out, we have described the Copyright Clause as ‘both a grant of power and 
a limitation[.]’”185  Thus, Ginsburg’s reasoning in her analysis of whether 
Congress had exceeded its authority under the copyright clause declared 
that, “We have also stressed, however, that it is generally for Congress, not 
the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s 
objectives.”186  However, what is most troubling about Ginsburg’s analysis 
 
177. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  While the petitioners in Eldred asserted other theories (e.g., 
violations of the First amendment) that Congress had exceeded its authority under the copyright 
clause in extending copyrights under the Copyright Term Extension Act, the authority of Congress 
to extend the term is the only issue that will be addressed here. 
178. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193-94. 




183. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211-12 (2003).  (“The CTEA’s extension of existing 
copyrights categorically fails to “promote the Progress of Science,” petitioners argue, because it 
does not stimulate the creation of new works but merely adds value to works already created”); 
see also Lawrence A. Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1065 
(2001). 
184. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221-22. 
185. Id. at 212 (quoting Granham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)). 
186. Id. 
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is her repeated rejection of the overarching public interests that the 
copyright clause is intended to preserve, with its explicit language 
concerning the limited term of copyright protection.187  In responding to 
Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Stephen Breyer who each dissented 
separately in Eldred, Ginsburg states, 
JUSTICE STEVENS’ characterization of reward to the author as a 
‘secondary consideration’ of copyright law . . . understates the 
relationship between such rewards and the ‘Progress of Science.’  
As we have explained ‘the economic philosophy behind the 
[Copyright] [C]lause . . . is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.188 
Thus, Ginsburg concludes in Eldred, “as we read the Framers’ instruction, 
the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual 
property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends 
of the Clause.”189 
While the decision in Eldred causes concern that works might, 
depending on Congressional judgment, never pass into the public domain 
for the good of society, what is especially striking is the vehement language 
and dangerously anti-public interest analysis Ginsburg employed to respond 
to Stevens and Breyer’s concerns.190  One wonders, based upon the 
language employed by Ginsburg extolling the substantial deference 
Congress enjoys in areas of copyright law, whether any lengthy grant of 
copyright protection would run afoul of the ‘limited times’ requirement of 
the Federal Constitution.191  However, Eldred has received vast praise and 
criticism.192  For example, Representative Mary Bono, a proponent of the 
CTEA, spoke out regarding her support for the bill on the floor of the 
House of Representatives, in the United States Congress.  Representative 
Bono stated , “Sonny [Bono] wanted the term of copyright protection to last 
forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the 
Constitution.  I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our 
copyright laws in all of the ways available to us.”193  One wonders whether 
 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 212 n.18. 
189. Id. at 222. 
190. Id. at 221-22. 
191. Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The express grant of a perpetual copyright would 
unquestionably violate the textual requirement that the authors’ exclusive rights be only “for 
limited times’” (emphasis added)). 
192. Id. at 207 n.15. 
193. 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bono); see also Lessig, supra note 
183, 1065-66. 
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the Court that decided Eldred wouldn’t have lent a sympathetic ear to the 
concerns of Representative Bono, especially in light of their apparent 
adoption of the ideology that “copyright law celebrates the profit 
motive.”194 
3. Golan v. Holder – A Final Erosion of the Rights of the Public 
The most recent development in the United States Supreme Court’s 
refusal to acknowledge the primacy of the public domain, of writers, and 
the necessity of author’s moral rights, is the case of Golan v. Holder.195  
The outcome of the case was 7-2, with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg once 
again being assigned an important copyright clause decision, and Justice 
Stephen Breyer writing a dissent, in which Justice Samuel Alito 
concurred.196  The case merits discussion in this article because it forms, 
along with Dastar and Eldred an important trilogy of cases in which the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that any statutory rights, for writers 
(including, inter alia, moral rights) must be statutory, and significantly, that 
the rights and interests of the public to the shared national wealth that 
writers and artists contribute to the fabric of society is also statutory, which 
must be guaranteed by Congress and not through constitutional protections 
as interpreted by the Court, arguably rendering the Court’s duty to ensure 
the protections inherent in the copyright clause for both author and public a 
dead letter.197 
At issue in Golan were restored copyrights granted to foreign works 
that were currently in the public domain.  In order for, as articulated in the 
case, the United States to be in full compliance with the Berne Convention, 
it was necessary for Congress to enact Section 514 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, 
which grants copyright protection to preexisting works of Berne 
member countries, protected in their country of origin, but lacking 
protection in the United States . . . As a consequence of the 
barriers to U.S. copyright protection prior to the enactment of § 
514, foreign works ‘restored’ to protection by the measure had 
entered the public domain in this country.198 
 
194. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 213. 
195. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
196. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 873. 
197. Id. at 888.  “[W]e explained, the Clause ‘empowers Congress to determine the 
intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the 
Clause.’”  Id. (emphasis added). 
198. Id. at 878. 
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As this Article has repeatedly stressed, however, the United States has not 
achieved full Berne implementation due to its resistance to the acceptance – 
through statutory means – of author’s moral rights.  Equally significant with 
Golan, however, is the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the public’s interest to 
works that were in the public domain, and which had been freely enjoyed 
by the members of the public.  With the passage of Section 514, works that 
had previously been enjoyed freely (without the requisite of a royalty 
payment), would revert to a state of copyright protection through statutory 
restoration of their protected status, thus requiring schools, orchestras, 
charitable groups, among others, to be required to pay up, or not perform 
the work that they had been able to freely do prior to the law’s 
enactment.199  The Court notes that Congress in passing section 514, 
included cushions for users of works previously freely available. However, 
this does not change the fact that once the period of applicability for those 
cushions ends, so too does the ability to freely use and disseminate the now-
copyrighted work.200 
In challenging Congress’ authority to enact section 514, the Petitioners 
in Golan argued that Congress had exceeded both its authority under the 
copyright clause, unilaterally deciding to remove works that had been 
enjoyed in the public domain and restoring them to copyrighted status, and, 
moreover, that Congress had violated the First Amendment.201  The 
argument implicating the First Amendment is a fascinating approach to 
dealing with cases in which Congress has excessively guaranteed profit 
over the rights of the public through, inter alia, enormous terms of 
copyright protection, and restored a significant number of works to 
protection from their prior resting place in the public domain.202  This 
Article, however, addresses only the argument petitioners advanced in 
arguing Congress exceeded its authority under the copyright clause. 
The Court’s decision summarily deals with the copyright clause 
argument and suggests that the interests advanced by the Petitioner 
mirrored those addressed in Eldred.203  Once again, utilizing a troubled 
form of logic, the Court dismissed the Petitioners’ claim that there was 
anything “unlimited” about the duration or restoration of copyright 
 
199. Id. at 893 (noting that works that could previously be used for free must now, after the 
passage of section 514, be obtained in the marketplace like any other copyrighted work). 
200. Id. at 882-83. 
201. Id. at 883. 
202. Cf. id. at 904 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Apparently there are no precise figures about the 
number of works the Act affects, but in 1996 the then-Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, 
thought that they ‘probably number in the millions.’”). 
203. Id. at 884-85 (majority opinion). 
          
2012] CREATING THE NATIONAL WEALTH 197 
protection afforded by Congress through its enactment of Section 514.204  
However, it is not at all certain that the question presented by Golan can be 
dispositive in light of Eldred.  For one, Eldred dealt with a lengthening of 
copyright terms, thus raising the question that whether such extraordinary 
grants of copyright term protections by Congress were such that a work 
could ever lapse into the public domain, such that Congress would violate 
the language of limitation – “limited Times” – expressly stated in the 
Federal Constitution. 
In Golan, however, the logic and issue shifts – because the works at 
issue in Golan were already within the public domain, thus necessitating 
Congress resurrecting these foreign works from free use and placing them 
within the protection of U.S. copyright law.  It is questionable whether any 
duration of time afforded by Congress to protect a copyrighted work would 
ever run afoul of the Court’s rationale.  However, as seen in Golan, if 
Congress can withdraw works from the public domain at will, and grant 
copyright protection to some date fixed in the future, it seems that the 
purpose and restraints imposed by the Founders on terms of copyright 
protection would be rendered meaningless.  In effect, these extensions 
would permit Congress to grant in substance – though not in name – a 
perpetual copyright.  The Court avoids this conclusion largely on two 
grounds.  First, the terms of protection granted by Congress are not 
unlimited, in that they do – whether it be the lifetime of the author or 
decades – have, in an abstract sense, a quantifiable limit to their duration.205  
Second, Congress, not the court, is charged with determining the copyright 
laws that will best advance the demands of the Federal Constitution, and so 
changes in copyright – including advancing interests of authors and the 
public – must be made through statutory means, and not through the 
courts.206 
However, Justice Breyer’s dissent articulates appropriately the costs 
that section 514 will have on the Nation.  As he states it, “[i]f a school 
orchestra or other nonprofit organization cannot afford the new charges, so 
be it.  They will have to do without – aggravating the already serious 
problem of cultural education in the United States.”207  Moreover, Justice 
Breyer notes that individuals wishing to use these now restored works often 
face the arduous requirements of searching for the copyright holders 
(especially if they are orphan works) of these previously freely available 
 
204. Id. at 885. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 905 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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works.  Such searches entail, “[u]nusually high administrative costs [that] 
threaten to limit severely the distribution of those works – works which, 
despite their characteristic lack of economic value, can prove culturally 
invaluable.”208  Such questions are, in Justice Breyer’s dissent, best 
addressed by the judicial branch.  As he posits it, “the question is whether 
the Copyright Clause permits Congress to seriously exacerbate such a 
problem by taking works out of the public domain without a countervailing 
benefit.  This question is appropriate for judicial resolution.”209  
Unfortunately, the Court has adopted just such an approach, allowing for 
Congress to lengthen copyright terms well beyond the initial statutory 
grants created by the Framers.  Now, in Golan, Congress may freely 
remove works, which have been relied upon to advance knowledge, the arts, 
and literary creation and expression, from the public domain.  Permitting 
this activity comes with the added irony that Congress’ divestiture of these 
works from the public does little to promote the interests of authors – whom 
the copyright clause is designed to protect.  Allowing Congress to remove 
these works from the public domain arguably does greater harm than good 
to the Nation’s cultural advancement.210 
After Wheaton, Dastar, Eldred, and Golan it is clear that any effort to 
attain moral rights for authors will have to come from Congressional action 
through the form of statutory requirements that explicitly provide for such 
rights, or through the legislatures of the states enacting their own 
protections, or be provided for specifically in the contractual agreements 
entered into between authors and the distributors of their work. 
C. THE ROLE OF THE LITERARY CONTRACT 
Henry C. Mitchell asserts, 
“[i]t is also important to remember that the interests of authors and 
publishers generally run parallel, even if they are not identical.  
The relationship is analagous to the relationship between the 
members of the union and the management of a company:  each 
seeks to gain at the expense of the other, but each needs the other 
to survive.211 
 
208. Id.  Indeed, Justice Breyer also notes that this problem of “orphan works” has already 
resulted in libraries and universities being unable to make available substantial collections 
available to the public.  Id. 
209. Id. at 906 (emphasis added). 
210. Id. at 910. 
211. HENRY C. MITCHELL, THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS:  TOWARD AN ECOLOGY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 150 (2005). 
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This is a pragmatic view concerned with the underlying commercial 
transaction being consummated between two distinct parties with a shared 
purpose – publication of a particular literary work.212  It is also a narrow 
approach to an issue that has much larger dynamics, as illustrated by Dastar 
and Eldred, and by the concern that the Framers showed in drafting the 
Federal Constitution’s limited time requirement for copyright protection.213  
These larger issues should be of concern not only to individuals entering 
into a literary contract, whereby they seek some right of publication or other 
form of distribution, rather, these issues should be of concern to every 
member of our society; and, Mitchell’s contention that authors and 
publishers have an inherently shared interest should be especially 
scrutinized.  While this is certainly true on a surface level, the underlying 
dynamics of the transaction are arguably not shared.214  The power will 
more often than not, in negotiations between author and distributor, rest 
with the more powerful entity, typically the distributor.215  After all, if the 
author had power of their own to print and publish, they probably would 
pursue that course of action.  Thus, it is important at the outset to 
acknowledge that individual authors, especially those not yet recognized as 
having commercial value because of who they are will likely to have an 
especially difficult time negotiating rights equivalent to moral rights.  Moral 
rights should arguably be guaranteed under the Berne Convention, but 
authors are limited under United States laws pertaining to protections of 
authorial rights.  It is important to recognize that as reassuring and desirable 
as it is to have a literary contract proposed, negotiated, and consummated 
between private actors, concerning distribution of a literary work of art 
viewed through a paradigm of an inherently private transaction, it is not so 
simple.  Agreements to publish literary works cannot be viewed as simply 
occurring in a vacuum between two private parties, because of the 
significant intellectual and creative force those works have to render into 
the collective body of knowledge of the community – that is, the wealth of 
the nation. 
 
212. See generally id. (providing examples of how this argument applies to user-centered 
intellectual property theories). 
213. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
214. Madeo, supra note 21, at 217 (explaining that current law does not provide an adequate 
remedy to authors’ work that is distorted throughout the publication process). 
215. Ng, Authors Rights, supra note 16, at 471 (“The author alone is seldom capable, 
financially and strategically, of marketing the work or transforming the original work into a 
different artistic medium without the assistance of a publisher and financier.  Even if the author 
may have the financial capability and market connections to market the work or transform the 
original into a new medium, he may lack the business acumen to manage the commercial 
exploitation of the work.”). 
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While literary contracts are chiefly private, between private parties, 
contracted according to their interests, demands, and desires, and guided by 
freedom of contract, this is not necessarily the best approach.  There is a 
particular social importance which attaches to some literature, though 
admittedly, not all creative works.216  Thus, we must reassess some of our 
traditional views concerning contracts as they apply to the narrow, specific 
cases of literary contracts, with a view to both the private, personal interests 
of the parties, and the larger, long-term public interests in ensuring that 
works of artistic integrity enter into the stream of commerce as the author 
intends through ensuring long-term benefit to the author in the form of 
moral rights, and that they subsequently become a part of the public domain 
of knowledge and use within a reasonable amount of time. 
IV. ENSURING THE WEALTH OF THE NATION:  COPYRIGHT 
TERMS, MORAL RIGHTS, AND AUTHORS AND THEIR 
CONTRACTS 
In a speech before Congress, the great American writer Samuel 
Clemens (better known as Mark Twain), made the following remarks, 
The excuse for a limited copyright in the United States is that an 
author who has produced a book and has had the benefit of it for 
that term has had the profit of it long enough, and therefore the 
Government takes the property, which does not belong to it, and 
generously gives it to the eighty-eight millions.  That is the idea.  
If it did that, that would be one thing.  But it does not do anything 
of the kind.  It merely takes the author’s property, merely takes 
from his children the bread and profit of that book, and gives the 
publisher double profit.  The publisher and some of his 
confederates who are in the conspiracy rear families in affluence, 
and they continue the enjoyment of these ill-gotten gains 
generation after generation.  They live forever, the publishers 
do.217  (emphasis added) 
Twain who was advocating for the increase in copyright protections then 
under consideration by Congress, clearly wanted longer terms, and 
 
216. I do not entirely agree with the evaluation suggested by Alina Ng.  However, I think she 
has correctly deduced and articulated the problems associated with a purely economic oriented 
methodology by which to assess artistic merit, and to decide from that perspective which works 
deserve copyright protection, as opposed to an approach that takes authorial ethics into account.  
See id. at 493-94. 
217. Arguments Before the Comm. on Patents of the Senate and House, Conjointly, on S. 
6330 and H.R. 19583 to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 59th Cong. 116-
17 (1966). 
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Congress subsequently enacted them, in the form of the 1909 Copyright 
Act.218  But Twain’s rhetoric is somewhat misdirected and misguided, in 
that it confuses two issues.  It is not the government, per se which “takes the 
property,” rather the government ceases to give it protection under law.  
This is an important distinction, because it is by negative act that a work of 
literary art becomes a part of the public domain, and not an active taking as 
Twain seems to imply.219  Moreover, it is not the government who “gives 
the publisher double profit,” by allowing the publisher to reprint without 
requiring royalties to be paid to the author, rather it is the common pool of 
knowledge and resources from which the publisher is drawing from the 
public domain, and disseminating to individuals that is the true subject of 
Twain’s scorn.  And that is the point.220  To not reward publishers who 
seize upon things as soon as they enter into the public domain, and who 
reprint an author’s work without any concomitant requirement of payment 
to the author or his heirs.  Instead, the point is to ensure the creative 
achievement never dies with the author – whether Mark Twain or 
Shakespeare – so that instead of vesting solely in the author’s earthly 
representative (the work’s distributor), it becomes accessible to all.  In fact, 
the individual plaintiff at the center of Eldred, Eric Eldred, maintained a 
website where he collected and digitized books as they came into the public 
domain, free for all to use. 
While Twain was undoubtedly concerned about the length of copyright 
at the time it existed, his philosophy nevertheless stands against the intent 
of the Framers, and arguably, against the overarching premise of intellectual 
achievement and knowledge.221  Knowledge enjoys a privileged vantage 
point in society, both historically and today, and without free dissemination 
and exchange of knowledge, ideas, and creative achievements, society’s 
growth is stunted, and every individual suffers as a result.222  As Lawrence 
Lessig, the lawyer who argued Eldred before the United States Supreme 
Court, stated 
 
218. ASS’N OF RES. LIBRARIES, supra note 80. 
219. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30-34 (1964) (noting the right an author has to reap 
the economic benefit of his creativity, but balancing that right with the rights the public has to free 
and unfettered access to the creative work). 
220. Lessig, supra note 183, at 1069 (“This modern, ordinary view, is far from our Framers’.  
When they chose not to protect copyright in perpetuity, it was not because they did not love 
property; nor was it because they were budding communists.  It was instead because they believed 
in the power of the Enlightenment, and Protestant as they were, they believed enlightenment 
happened when culture was not controlled by the church.  Their idea was that ideas and stories 
and culture would be free - as quickly as the law could set them free.”). 
221. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(discussing the “marketplace of ideas” in the context of First Amendment concerns). 
222. Id. 
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[W]e have become used to an idea that was not our Framers’.  We 
have become accustomed to thinking of the monopoly rights that 
the state extends not as privileges granted to authors in exchange 
for creativity, but as rights.  And not as rights that get defined or 
balanced against other state interests, but as rights that are, like 
natural property rights, permanent and absolute.223 
Lessig’s assessment stands in stark contrast to that suggested by Twain, and 
argues that rather than government running amok seizing authors’ creative 
works, the stream of what can be “seized” and delivered into the public 
domain is steadily being reduced, with Congress’ acquiescence (and the 
Supreme Court’s acceptance) to the vast detriment of both authors and the 
public.  Both authors and the public suffer when the effort to commercialize 
literary works becomes a relentless pursuit to keep them in private hands, 
for private purposes indefinitely, while keeping the public as a secondary 
concern.224  Such an approach demeans the cultural greatness that literary 
and other artistic works have to offer the social community, and ultimately 
restrains the potential for other creative works to emerge.  Such restrictions 
serve to deprive society of valuable contributions of authors that might 
otherwise be more freely available.225  There is also a certain irony in 
enacting vast terms of copyright protection that no one will really ever live 
to see expire, while continuing to deny authors protections for moral rights.  
And it certainly begs the question of what interests have become the heart 
of what we are seeking to protect?226 
It is difficult to find hope for the view that public interests should be an 
important consideration in our understanding of copyright law, when the 
Supreme Court seems to suggest that profit is the sole force which both 
motivates creativity, and ensures the progress of science.227  But this 
 
223. Lessig, supra note 183, at 1068. 
224. Ng, Authors and Readers, supra note 30, at 415 (“The grant of property rights to 
copyright owners and not authors in today’s system creates a market for literary and artistic works 
that does not encourage the development of authorship and the process of creativity needed for the 
production of works for the public.”). 
225. Of course modern technology can also be mobilized in the effort to thwart access to 
literary work.  See, e.g., Matthew Finnegan, Harper Collins Rouses Gang of Angry Librarians, 
TECHEYE (Mar. 1, 2011, 2:10 PM), http://www.techeye net/internet/harper-collins-rouses-gang-
of-angry-librarians; Benedicte Page, Fury over ‘stupid’ restrictions to Library ebook loans, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2011, 7:44 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/mar/01/restrictions-
library-ebook-loans (both articles discuss proposed restrictions, by publishers, on the number of 
times an electronic e-book can be downloaded and read by library patrons, under the licenses 
possessed by libraries). 
226. Lessig, supra note 183, at 1068-69 (suggesting that those interests have become 
interests of commercialization, and profits in the hands of the few – certainly not, to respond to 
Twain’s concerns about extending copyright protections, to the author). 
227. Indeed, especially troubling is the restoration of copyright to those works which have 
entered the public domain.  See Adam Liptak, Restoring Copyright to Public Domain Works, N.Y. 
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approach to conceptualizing literature, art, and creative achievements is 
symptomatic of a much larger societal problem, one which Lessig addresses 
quite forcefully.  Lessig asserts: 
This view of the naturalness of intellectual property is not simply 
the construction of overly eager Hollywood lobbyists.  Is it not 
simply the product of campaign contributions and insider 
corruption.  The reality is that it reflects the understanding of 
ordinary people, too.  The ordinary person believes, as Disney’s 
Michael Eisner does, that Mickey Mouse should be Disney’s for 
time immemorial.  The ordinary person doesn’t even notice the 
irony of perpetual protection for Disney for Mickey, while Disney 
turns out Hunchback of Notre Dame (to the horror of the Victor 
Hugo estate), or Pocahontas, or any number of stories that it can 
use to make new work.  The ordinary person doesn’t notice, 
because the ordinary person has become so accustomed to the idea 
that culture is managed – that corporations decide what gets 
released when, and that the law can be used to protect criticism 
when the law is being used to protect property – that the ordinary 
person can’t imagine the world of balance our Framers created.228 
Literature, and other forms of art, have significant cultural value for our 
social community, and for the progress of society.  This is embodied in our 
Federal Constitution, and is implicit in the balance that has been struck 
between private rights and public interests. 
As has been made clear by Wheaton and Dastar, moral rights do not 
exist in the United States, absent Congressional enactment of express 
statutory protections designed to effectuate those rights.229  This is the 
wrong approach to dealing with authors and their literary works.  While we 
continue to expand copyright term protections, we continue to deny basic 
rights to authors that have long been enjoyed in other countries, with whom 
we share similar histories and backgrounds.  Instead of viewing such rights 
as anathema to economic or other commercial interests, we should 
recognize that works of art, especially those of a literary nature, serve the 
 
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/us/22bar html.  Arguably, 
combining Congressional authority to extend again and again copyright protections to currently 
copyrighted work, thus preventing its expiration into the public domain, combined with 
retroactively granting copyright to those works that have entered the public domain, come 
dangerously close to rendering the Federal Constitution’s public interest inherent in the copyright 
clause immaterial. 
228. Lessig, supra note 183, at 1069. 
229. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003).  “When 
Congress has wished to create such an addition to the law of copyright, it has done so with much 
more specificity than the Lanham Act’s ambiguous use of ‘origin.’”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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overall wealth of the nation by increasing our common resources of 
knowledge, and provide the substance of our national identity and cultural 
spirit – all of which advances our collective national interests.  As such, 
works of literary art should be treated in a way that recognizes their larger, 
long-term interests in the social community, which respects the creator of 
those works – the author.  Little is lost by enacting copyright laws that 
protect the rights of attribution; indeed, absent an agreement to the contrary, 
such a right seems one basically ingrained in the right of an author’s 
personhood and their literary creation, which is arguably inseparable from 
that personhood. 
The right of integrity seems one equally calculated to bring about the 
long-term interests of ensuring works of literary and artistic merit that are 
not grossly distorted by short-term economic profit, and which ultimately 
enter the public domain.230  The rights of withdrawal, and disclosure 
potentially raise problematic issues, however, because they can occur after a 
contract has been signed, or after the work has already been placed on the 
market.  However, with proper indemnification clauses or other similar 
requirements, or writing into law implied or express waivers of these 
protections, authors and their distributors can continue to carry on business 
with, moreover, this knowledge at the front-end of the relationship that 
those rights exist, and that they may (and probably should) be negotiated as 
part of the overall literary contract. 
By enacting these provisions we honor and respect authors as part of 
the national wealth, acknowledge the intellectual creations that propel the 
nation forward, and ensure that these works meet with the expectations of 
their authors, that they continue to be identified as the creator of their work, 
and that the work not be distorted or modified, such that Hemingway’s 
thoughtful, existential hero in THE SUN ALSO RISES, Jake Barnes, is not 
devolved into a comedic figure, better suited for laughter than for 
philosophical contemplation, or Bryce Courtney’s THE POWER OF ONE is 
not distorted to change, for example, the location of the novel from South 
Africa to Texas, because politics, history, and ethical choice matter for 
these authentic works of literary art.  Moreover, such rights should continue 
into the future, and be alienable to subsequent successors in interest of the 
author’s moral right, such that an author’s wishes continue to be 
 
230. Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions, supra note 124, at 439 (suggesting that 
“[w]hen a publisher usurps an author’s creative control, the author’s work can become an 
instrument for profit-maximization instead of authentic self-expression, leading to a uniform 
product that reflects an effort to create consumer needs, rather than to meet them”). 
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respected.231  Indeed, as Donald Francis Madeo noted, in assessing the 
United States’ lack of moral rights where author’s literary creations are 
concerned, “[t]he current law does not penetrate the core problem – what 
happens when someone, whether it be a publisher, biographer or even a 
literary executor, ignores the wishes of the author violating the author’s 
wishes and compromising the author’s artistic integrity?”232 
Of course, part of the problem with enacting moral rights is, in some 
ways, changing the view that an author’s work is merely an economic 
product, exploitable, mutable, transferable, and not, as it arguably should be 
viewed, as something part of the larger cultural discourse and national 
wealth.233  However, simply because literary artifacts and the copyright 
protections they enjoy have so-long been viewed as being mere economic 
commodities in the eyes of the law, as exemplified by Ginsburg’s opinion 
in Eldred, there is no reason to continue to view them as such.  Instead, 
such prevailing views should become the flashpoint for restoring literature 
and its place in the cultural space of the community as a core American 
value, concomitant with the recognition of fundamental rights for literary 
creators. 
All of these larger concerns regarding moral rights (and to an extent 
copyright protection terms), devolve back into the singular space they 
occupy at the outset – the contract between author and distributor of the 
author’s work.  This is the fundamental place, operating within the 
“carefully crafted bargain”234 that forms the backdrop for their negotiations.  
However, as with so many contracts negotiated between individuals and 
larger entities, authors will usually, though not always, be in a poorer 
position to bargain in terms of parity of bargaining power.235  However, 
with the recognition of moral rights, authors will be given new tools to 
ensure the integrity of their literary work, while also providing incentives to 
would-be distributors in crafting their agreements with authors. 
By having statutory provisions concerning moral rights, these 
provisions would form the backdrop for any private negotiations taking 
place between author and distributor.  They would inform both parties 
 
231. But see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of 
the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings . . . but upon 
the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will 
be prompted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.  
Congress thus seeks to define the rights included in copyright so as to serve the public welfare and 
not necessarily so as to maximize an author’s control over his or her product.” (citations omitted)). 
232. Madeo, supra note 21, at 217. 
233. Lessig, supra note 183, at 1072-73. 
234. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003). 
235. Ng, Author Rights, supra note 16, at 471. 
          
206 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:161 
decisions, and could potentially provide the author with some greater 
leverage to extract from their distributor assurances that the work would be 
attributed to them, ensure the integrity of the work, and potentially allow 
the author to seek further specific assurances against the work being 
disclosed when not ready, or to withdraw the work if the author later 
fundamentally changes their intellectual viewpoint, such that the work is no 
longer representative of them.  These statutory provisions could be subject 
to waiver with consent of the author, be required in certain instances by 
statute, or be non-waivable, depending on Congressional or other legislative 
decision.  The point is, however, that such rights should be present at the 
front-end of the negotiations, and should form a cornerstone of author–
distributor negotiations, as opposed to being something foreign and distant. 
Finally, if the author consciously and freely chooses to relinquish their 
moral rights, they should receive, in addition to their already negotiated 
agreement, some form of further consideration.236  This is in accord with 
practices in other jurisdictions, and seems a reasonable one, calculated to 
ensure the overall fairness of the agreement – the author gives up 
something, and the distributor, in exchange, must pay or give something 
more for that relinquishment of right by the author.  However, it must be 
recognized that often such consideration for relinquishment of moral rights 
will be little to nothing, and instead will be compelled (and thus rendered 
pro forma) as part of the overall approach of the distributor to getting the 
deal that most represents their demands.  In such instances, the doctrine of 
unconscionability seems aptly suited to deal with these necessary and 
searching inquiries (should these agreements be litigated), to ascertain 
whether, in fact, the consideration was so low, and the moral right so great, 
that the term of the agreement should be struck in favor of an author’s 
moral rights, which is also, as has been argued, a vindication of public 
interests.237  Such a use of unconscionability is in accord with its underlying 
purpose, and should be used not to strike agreements that are merely so 
shocking to the conscience as to render them unenforceable, but also to 
vindicate substantial and significant public interests in the national wealth 
 
236. Whether negligible or not, this requirement of additional consideration nevertheless 
gives notice to both writer and publisher of the right(s) for which release or modification are being 
negotiated, and places an additional right within the purview of the author for his authentic and 
creative work. 
237. See Michael B. Lopez, Resurrecting the Public Good:  Amending the Validity Exception 
in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods for the 21st 
Century, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 133, 165-66 (2010) (discussing in the context of international trade 
the use of unconscionability to equalize bargaining disparities in order to reduce the threat of 
overreaching). 
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of its literary and artistic creations.238  Of course, expanding the use of 
unconscionability this way will require a cultural shift in thinking on the 
part of courts, but so too will understanding moral rights as being not just 
author rights, but rights designed to effectuate a larger social purpose, by 
having in the public repository of knowledge works of genuine literary 
merit. 
V. CONCLUSION:  TOWARDS A LITERARY CONTRACT 
FOR TOMORROW 
The great Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard wrote, “[t]here is 
something of greatness about me, but because of the poor state of the 
market I am not worth much.”239  Kierkegaard would have known much 
about the literary market at the time he lived.  Though he was a particularly 
well-known figure in Denmark, and certainly in his hometown of 
Copenhagen, most of his works never sold especially well.  And yet he has 
grown to be one of the most influential philosophers of our time, even 
though he died in 1855.  Similarly, the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, 
whose works sold poorly, such as THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, BEYOND 
GOOD AND EVIL, and THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS, continue to inspire 
intellectual thought, debate, and societal growth, not just in his native 
Germany, but everywhere in the world.240  Poets like A.E. Housman, who 
could not even find a publisher for his seminal volume, A SHROPSHIRE 
LAD, now an enduring classic were forced to self-publish, before they could 
find commercial, and thus publishing recognition.  Artists like the great 
Impressionist Vincent Van Gogh sold only a single painting in his lifetime, 
and yet now one is hard pressed to find a college dorm room or apartment 
that does not have a mechanically reproduced image of his “The Starry 
Night” or “Café Terrace at Night,” hanging in it. 
All of these examples speak to the fundamental reasons of why the 
market is not necessarily the place best suited for creating and sustaining 
genius, but even more so, why the Federal Constitution provides for a 
limited times rationale for copyright protection.  Indeed, one of the central 
 
238. Cf. Phillip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1516-20 (2003) (discussing the rise of “positive-
freedom” criticism in assessing the usefulness of unconscionability). 
239. SØREN KIERKEGAARD, PAPERS AND JOURNALS:  A SELECTION 179 (Alastair Hannay 
ed. & trans., 1996). 
240. See R.J. HOLLINGDALE, NIETZSCHE:  THE MAN AND HIS PHILOSOPHY 179 (2001) 
(noting that the first three parts of Nietzsche’s THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA [now a classic of 
philosophy] were commercial failures, and that his publisher declined to print the fourth edition); 
see also Peter Gay, Introduction to BASIC WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE, at xix-xxiii (Walter 
Kaufmann trans., 2000). 
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contentions of this article is that the Framers never intended for works such 
as those, for example, by Housman, Nietzsche, Van Gogh, or Kierkegaard 
to stay forever in the domain of their publishers, long after they had died 
and could no longer reap the rewards of their creative genius.  Instead, the 
intent was to reward them for a time, and then to release those works into 
the public milieu and discourse of intellectual thought, discussion, debate, 
and creativity of the larger social community, that the next generation of 
Van Gogh’s, Kierkegaard’s, Mozart’s and Beethoven’s might come forward 
to carry society ever further, through the advancement of knowledge and 
culture. 
And yet our current system of copyright, avoidance of moral rights for 
authors, and misplaced trust in the fair, bargained for exchange between 
authors and their distributors is not best situated, as it currently stands, to 
effectuate the larger hope and purpose of the Federal Constitution’s 
copyright requirements, nor the larger social interests which it is intended to 
serve.  The modest proposals presented here, reducing the period of 
copyright years for a work to be protected, granting authors moral rights 
through creating statutory protections that can be used in contract 
negotiations, and utilizing doctrines like unconscionability to ensure the 
overarching public interest in literary works of artistic merit, represent a 
measured approach. 
Such an approach protects private, economic interests (copyright 
protections remain intact) that reward individual creativity and ingenuity, 
authors (ensuring the integrity and attribution of their work), and the 
general public (that knowledge and information be recognized as something 
for everyone to participate and grow from).  This is the ideology that should 
guide us as we continue to confront modern issues of copyright, author 
rights, and the contracts that authors enter into – and, as Wheaton, Eldred, 
Dastar, and Golan show, they are not likely to diminish or vanish.  In 
suggesting this moderate proposal, the hope is that all of the individual 
holders of interest – distributors of authorial material, authors, and the 
public, see that through reasonably measuring each holder’s interest, while 
constraining it in an equally measured way, everyone in society benefits, 
because we all have access to the knowledge, creativity, and information 
necessary to grow.  The end goal of that growth should be to built upon – 
not replace – the artistic and literary greats who have come before, and to 
nourish the growth and development (and economic potential) of the next 
generation of Hemingway’s and Van Gogh’s that remain yet to be 
discovered and disseminated. 
